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Abstract of
DEFENSE CONTRACTING POLICY. AN
INTERFACE MECHANISM WITH THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY

A broad overview of the contractual relationship between
the military and the defense industry with emphasis on
contracting trends anel the impact of these trends on the
nature of the defense industry, shipbuilding in particular.
A brief historical

surve~

of government contracting from

the American Revolution to the present time is designed to
review the principal legislative actions developed to control the procureaent process.

The advantages and disadvan-

tages of the important contract types are discussed.

From

a profile of the defense industry developed from geographic,
demographic, political, and national priority factors, the
nature of the so termed military-industrial complex is exained and found to be real, necessary, but largely ernetional when considered as a conspiracy against peace and
society.

Defense eontracting policy is found to be shift-

ins from cost reimbursement contract to the incentive contract.

The trend to contract incentives is found to be an

improvement over earlier policy but not without disadvantages.

The influence of the procurement strategy used by

the Department of Defense is examined through a summary of
the attitudes of the major shipbuilding organization.

The

conclusion is reached that the total package procurement

.ii

strategy is not favored by shipyard management.

Incen-

tive clauses, with carefully designed provisions, structured into phased cost plus and fixed price contract types
can serve to acquire ships at the lowest possible cost with
a minimum of over-run.

iii

PREFACE
Purpose!"

The goal of this paper is to examine the

i.nterface relationships between the Department of Defense
(Navy) and the private shipbuilding community (Industry)
for the purDose of expressing these relationships in the
dynamic business atmosphere of this rurrent day.

This in-

terface is largely defined by the contracting process and
the development of contracting will be briefly traced to
point up the trends which evolved into the complex contracting regulations which govern the defense-industrial
team.

The national, economic and political influences

which exert pressure upon this interface will be commented
on.
The Navy is under great pressure both from within and
outside of the Department of Defense to meet the major
threat of the Soviet fleet.

In order to meet the threat,

the Navy must effect a modernization program which includes
men, material; and methods.

It can be considered that this

modernization is mandatory if the United States is to continue the influence necessary to its national interests on
the sealanes of the world.
To effect this material modernization, the Navy relies
upon the industrial capability of the private

shipbu~lding

oJ.

ftWithin this paper, only the material aspect of the
modernization mentioned here will be considered.

Iv
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community.

The link by which the Navy communicates with

this community is the contract.

The Navy essentially says

what is wanted, when it is wanted, how good it should be,
and how much the Navy is willing to pay for the ship or
equipments through the medium of the contract.

All these

categories are under much critical examination as they relate to the specification of required characteristics, and
the nature of the contract document is ever more important.
It also, in these days of complicated and involved business
proceedings, has taken on a complexity which is perhaps only
exceeded by the amount of money involved in the transaction.
The attitudes which are generated by this interface are of
great interest and will be explored where data is available.
Sources.

For the historical background review, several

volumes were consulted which must be considered as secondary sources.

For the technical data on contracting, con-

tracting officer's guidebooks were consulted to form the
basis for this discussion along with numerous detailed
studies by experts of the Rand Corporation and several other
institutions.

No attempt was made to reduce the over-

whelming volume of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations into a usable form.

Primary sources, such as hearing

transcripts, government publications, and news articles were
used as much as possible.

Much reduced data, presented in

tabular form must be considered secondary in nature.

v
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DEFENSE CONTRACTING POLICY a AN
INTERFACE MECHANISM WITH THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY
CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
This is a paper about a mechanism and an interface.
The mechanism is the process of contracting, the interface
is the contact region between the military or if you prefer,
the goverrunent, and the private business interests known
more popularly as the defense contractors.

The approach of

the paper is more exploratory than expository, taking the
shape of a study more than an innovative thesis.
There are a number of very influential people who are
extremely interested in this interface.

Certainly industrial

leaders, presidents of corporations and chairmen-of-the board
are interested.

Military men and politicians are interested,

but the new awareness of the citizenry has awakened the political sense of the legislative body regarding the militaryindustrial complex as never before.

Some members of the

Congress have long been voicing their concern but without
great general impact.

Senator William Proxmire has writtena

I believe that as citizens, as officials, as
servicemen, as American taxpayers, we must look hard at
all of the consequences of our uncritical attitude
toward the Pentagon, We must examine in detail the
over-runs, inefficiencies, and aborted weapons systems
the military-industrial complex has spawned. We must
oalculate closely what1the wastefulness and power of
the Pent880n costs us.
1

Senator Paul Douglas, who preceded Senator Proxmire as
Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee was somewhat more
specific as to blame when he commented:

II

• • • both the

Congress and the Executive branch of the United States
Government allowed the military to run wild without a
challenge." 2

Whether one agrees with the viewpoints of

these distinguished lawmakers or not, the fact must be
faced that the public sector is now expressing a greater
interest in the manner in which their monies have been,
and are being, and will be spent by the Defense Department
on their behalf.

There is doubt that the public interest

is indeed being served.

Critical comment from various in-

terest groups make the claim that the priorities of the
Nation should be changed to look inward at problems, rather than outward to the problems of foreign relations and
defense.

This changing attitude has been officially recog-

nized by the Department of Defense, and Defense Secretary
Laird, in his statement to the House Armed Services Committee, took note of this fact:
The shift in our priorities, away from defense and to
civilian pursuits, has been massive. The size and
price of this change is not generally appreciated. 3
The Secretary, at a later point in his discussion
points out his estimate of the relative size of this change:

The change in the Fiscal Year 1968 to Fiscal
Year 1972 period is especially signific~nt. Defense
spending drops by 23.9 billion dollars, while other
federal spending grows by 36.4 billion dollars. This
means that two-thirds of the real increase in civilian spending can be viewed as having been financed by
defense cutbacks. Civilian programs are increasing
by 36.4 billion dollars while the federal budget total (in rea1
increases by about one-third of
that amount. 4terms)
Thus, it would seem that these pressures have been reacted to and they have, however, one might have some difficulties with the arithmetic, the point to note is that
generally, there will be less money with which to buy new
weapon systems and more in the civilian sector.
These trends are, of course, motivated by many factors
other than the high cost of defense and a simple causative
formula does not exist, however, there is little doubt that
the public sector will continue to exert pressure against
the defense expenditure level.

This pressure will continue

until the public is satisfied that adequate measures are
being taken to reduce spending to the lowest feasible level.
More simply, the pressure will only be released when they
are assured that the most effective use of the appropriations
for defense purposes are being made.

The arguments must be

heard and positive actions taken in order to provide the
necessary assurances.

*The dollars to which the Secretary refers are 1972
valued dollars.

3

The complexities of the entire problem of spending
money for defense purposes wisely and efficiently are mind
boggling.

The enormous size of the organization (3,587,000

people)5 and the enormous budget *(78,743 million dollars)6
compose a management problem with challenges of every conceivable type.

Because of this complexity, only a small

portion of the problem can be treated herein.
It is considered that the interface between the Defense establishment and the defense oriented industry is an
area of fruitful concern.

This interface is generally de-

fined by the process of contracting and this is what will be
explored.

The author claims no expertise in this area, rath-

er he stands in awe of the complex legalities and the language
employed in such instruments.

This is as much a vehicle for

self-instruction as it is an attempt to strip some of these
complexities away and expose what might be considered the
essential elements of defining the contractual interface.
The historical development of the procurement process will
be briefly explored, consideration will be given to the
types of contracts which are now in use and the disadvantages

*The budget figure quoted here is recommended budget
authority for Fiscal Year 1972 for all military activities,
excluding AEC and other military related activities.

and the advantages of each type, and a discussion of the
present day major contracts in the shipbuilding area will
be undertaken, treating the attitudes and influences of
each of the parties in the agreement.

CHAPTER II
A BRIEF EVOLUTION OF CONTRACTING
Introduction.

Prior to World War II, the relation-

ship between the government and private industry was basically controlled by legislation which dates to 1860.

This

was not the beginning as there were several legal documents
prior to that time which were concerned with procurement,
however because of the cost and urgency of the Civil War,
military procurement was specifically addressed by the
federal government in that period.

Some concepts, such as

the advertised procurement, date beyond the Civil War
period to 1809.

The sections that follow are very brief and

touch only the legislative highlights of the period from the
time of the Constitution to the present.
The Constitution through 1860.

Article I, Section 8

of the Constitution authorizes the Congress to enact laws
affecting procurement.

Congress does this by enacting appro-

priations of funds to support those activities which it
approves.

The Congress has then naturally passed a number

of laws and regulations designed to ensure that the sums
that are provided by these appropriations are employed in
a legal manner and for the purpose which the Congress originally intended.

In 1792, the responsibility for purchases

and contracts for support of the Army was given to the
Department af the Treasury.

In 1795, a Purveyer of

Public Works was established within the Treasury to act
as the goverruent's purchasing agent.

Later, in 1798,

a Congress declared that contracts and supplies for services for military and the naval services would be made
by or under the direction of the chief officers of the
Department of Navy and Army.

The Department of the Treas-

ury through the Purveyor of Public Supplies, remained responsible for the execution of orders from the military
departments.
In 1808, the first conflict of interest problem
were tackled through 1e8is1ation.

Congress passed an

act which required that a clause appear in every contract
let by the government to the effect that a member of Congress may not receive any benefit from contracts which he
might have been instrumental in securing for friends and
relatives.
Formal advertising came into beins as a requirement
for government contracting in 1809.

The Act of 3 March 1809

required that formal advertisement be used in the procurement of all government supplies and services.

7

Formal advertising became a legislated requirement in
government practice through the Act of 3 March 1809.

This

Act directed that all government supplies and services be
procured from the lowest responsible bidder who answered an
advertised solicitation.
Subsequent legislation, passed in 1842 and 1843 re-emphasized procurement by formal advertising.

These Acts

introduced and required the use of sealed proposals, public
bid openings, and the first performance bond, which established forfeitures to not exceed twice the contract amount.
The Act of 28 June 1860 and the Civil Sundry Appropriations Act of 2 March 1861 were each pieces of legislation
which continued the emphasis on formal advertising as a
procurement technique, and beyond the revisions of later
years, was the basic procurement legislation in use by the
United States Government until 1947.

The basic provision of

the Act of 1860 is as follows:
All purchases and contracts for supplies or services
in any of the Departments of the Government, except for
personal services, when the public exigencies do not
require the immediate delivery of the article or articles, or performance of the service, shall be made by
advertisement a sufficient time previously for proposals
affecting the same. When immediate delivery or performance is required by the public exigency, the articles or service may be procured by open purchase or
contract at the places, and in the manner in which such
articles are usually bought or sold, or such services
engaged in between individuals. No contracts or purchases shall hereafter be made, unless the same be
authorized by law or be under an appropriation adequate
to its fUlfillment, except in the War and Navy
Departments, for clothing, sUbsistence, forage, fuel,

8

quarters. or transportation. which. however. shall
not exceed the necessities of the current year. 1
Placed into practice. this legislation meant that
the Government agencies could normally procure goods and
nonpersona1 services only by (a) public advertising for
bids responsive to detailed specification, (b) public opening of the bids at a specified time and place, and (c) award of the contract to the lowest responsible bidder complying with the conditions of the advertisement for bids.
The Act of 1860 did permit purchase by negotiation
when public exigencies necessitated immediate performance.
and upon occasion, Congress would provide specific authority for open market purchase for such items as transportation
(horses. mules), tooling (jigs and dies). medical supplies.
advertising services, and secret weapons and devices.
1874 to World War II.

In 1874. the Civil Sundry

Appropriations Act was revised and became known as Revised
Statute 3709.

After revision in 1878. it continued in ef-

fect until again being revised in 1910.

The 1910 revision

again strongly emphasized competitive procurement by formal
advertising. but in addition. listed specific exceptions
which could be subject to negotiated procurements.

These

exceptions were expanded from the Act of 1860 and oowered
the following areas,

1.

Emergency purchases in the event of a public

emergency.
2.

Purchases less than $500.

3.

Procurement from the Federal Prison Industry.

4.

Procurement of horses and mules.

5.

Procurement of proprietary items.

6.

Procurement of medical supplies.

7.

Procurement of bunting.

8.

Procurement of classified items.

9.

Procurement of dies and gages.

This legislation represented the standard regulating instrument of the government agencies during World War 1.*
The War and Navy Departments made much use of these
provisions during World War I.

Most of the items necess-

ary for the prosecution of the war effort were procured by
negotiation, in fact well over 50% of the total contracts
were nego_iated, exclUding primarily only standard quartermaster items.

The negotiated contract form used was the

*An act was passed in 1901 which prOVided, with specific reference to the Army, that hereafter, except in cases
of emergency or where it is impracticable to secure competition, the purchase of all supplies for the use of the
various departments and posts of the Army and of the branches of the Army Service shall only be made after advertisement,
and shall be purchased where the same can be purchased the
cheapest, quality and cost of transportation and the interests of the Government considered, but every open-market
emergency purchase made in the manner common among business
men which exceeds in amount $200 shall be reported for
approval to the Secretary of War under such regulations as
he may prescribe." This is an excerpt from 31 Stat. 905.
I

10

cost plus a percentage of the cost and this format was
greatly abused.

Much discussion took place in the halls

of government during and after the war years concerning
the apparent breakdown of formal advertising procedures.
No positive actions were implemented that were specifically
designed to correct the situation. 2 The legislation available during the interim between the World Wars was therefore
rather archaic in nature and it did not permit the flexibility that was necessary for the impending tasks of World War II.
It is not at all surprising that the regulations went untested during this time as the military services were highly
unpopular and there was much activity in the Congress in
which the 'Weapons Mongers' of industry, both in the
United States and abroad were highly criticized as profiteering through the manufacture of munitions.

Military

procurement budgets were small and there were several investigations by the Congress which kept matters lively.3
World War II.

On the threshold of World War II, the

deepening international situation led to additional activity on the part of the lawmakers to strengthen the national
defense posture.

These actions were to prepare the basic

regulations which are in effect today.

The nature of Re-

vised Statute 3709 (1910 Revision) was restrictive when

viewed in the light of the free wheeling policy required
to gear up for a major global war.

In the period 1939 -

1940, a series of acts were passed by the Congress which
were designed to ease the restrictions of Revised Statute
3709.

During this time, the significant trend was away

from the formally advertised toward negotiated procurements.
The important legislative actions which governed
World War II procurement are outlined as follows:
Public Works Act of 25 April 1939.

This act pro-

vided authorization to the Secretary of the Navy and the
War Departments to enter into negotiated arrangements for
the construction of public works projects situated outside
the continental United States.

The military departments

were also authorized to employ outSide architectural and
engineering firms for the preparation of designs, plans,
and specifications for any public works project or for the
construction of any Naval vessel or aircraft.

Contracts

thus negotiated were on the basis of cost plus a fixed fee,
which fee was not to exceed 10% of the estimated cost.
The Act of 13 July 1939.

This act specifically au-

thorized the War Department to procure special aircraft
parts, instruments and accessories when the nature of the
procurement was such that classification made it necessary
to avoid a public offering.

12

These contracts were entered

into on a negotiated basis.
The Multiple Awards Act of March 1940.

This Act was

designed to expand the production of aircraft and permitted
the Secretary of War to award contracts for aircraft, aircraft parts and accessories not only on the basis of the
lowest responsible bid but to the three lowest bidders, the
work to be divided between them to avoid loading production
facilities beyond capacity.
The National Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act
of 26 June 1940.

This Act gave authority to the Treasury

Department to forego bidding procedures specified by Revised Statute 3709 in the purchase of strategic materials.
The Act of 28 June 1940.

This Act, known popularly as

the Speed-Up Act, provided authority to make advanced payments to contractors up to 30% of the contract price.

It

further authorized the Navy Department to enter into negotiated contracts for the acquisition, construction, repair
or alteration of naval vessels or any portion thereof.

The

\>Jar Department was authorized to procure aircraft in the

same manner.
The Act of 2 July 1940.

This Act permitted the Secre-

tary of Nar to enter into those contracts which he deemed
necessary to construct Government owned facilities and to
provide for their operation with or without advertisement.
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Building on the experience of the first World War,
each of the above Acts expressly prohibited the use of
cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contract.

Use of a cost-

plus-fixed-fee contract was permitted, but fees were
limited to a maximum of between six to seven per cent of
the estimated cost.
The public exigency became operative just following
Pearl Harbor when the President, on 19 December 1941,
signed the First War Powers Act.

This executive action

removed most of the restrictions that had been placed upon
defense procurement practices through the legislative actions discussed.

This measure authorized departments or

agencies engaged in the war effort to enter into contracts
and to make amendments and modifications to contracts both
existing and projected and to make advance, progress, or
other payments against any contracts without regard to the
provisions of the oontract law.

Any such action taken of

course, had to be justifiable as essential to the prosecution of the war.
To extend further, the use of the negotiation technique, the War Production Board Number Two, on 3 March 1942,
directed that all contracts be awarded through negotiation.
Three principle criteria were to be met through these negotiations:

The primary emphasis was to be placed upon

timely delivery of the procured material; the contracts
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with the more difficult items should be placed with concerns with the requisite engineering, managerial, and
physical resources and less complex items should be placed
with smaller concerns, a contract should be placed with
those firms who required the least amount of new facilities
and equipment to perform against the contract.

The Direc-

tive also outlined precautions to ensure that work was
directed into areas of available labor and that inequities
in the demographic elements were minimized.

During the years

of the war then, the principal means of contracting was
negotiation, confirming the lesson of World War I.

Pro-

curement by formal advertisement is not an efficient means
of buying war materials in a national emergency.

It should

be further noted that negotiation was also successfully
utilized by the services as a procurement method.
Much of the regulation, both directive and legislative placed into effect during World War II was of a
temporary nature and following the

conflic~,

the mili-

tary services returned to the provisions spelled out in
Revised Statute 3709.

The experience gained from the lib-

eral climate fostered by expediency was to prove useful
in later years.
The Post-War Years.

In 1947 the Armed Services Pro-

curement Bill was passed by the Congress and signed into
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law by the Pres 1dent on 19 February 1948.

This law, Pub-

lic Law 413 of the Eightieth Congress, was effective on
19 May 1948, the day that the First War Powers Act terminated in effect as procurement authority.
The effect of this bill was to unify the Army, Navy,
and Air Force procurement authority under one statute.
Formal advertising is again called for as the primary
means for military procurement, however exceptions were
granted and negotiated purchases were permitted when circumstances might require or justify a departure from
competitive advertising.

Essentially this is the interpre-

ted as allowing the contract which best fits the procurement circumstances.

The Act, borrOWing from the most

effective procedures developed during the War, prOVided
for the making of advance payments, authorized the Comptroller General to remit liquidated damages which may be
incurred from contractor's delay, and prOVided for joint
procurement between the services.

The requirements of

this legislation are set forth in the Armed Services
Procurement Regulations or ASPR as they are more commonly
known.

Since the development of the ASPR, each of the

services have prepared a set of regulations which parallels the procedures of the ASPR while at the same time
particularizing them to the needs of the respective service.

16

In the Navy, this document is known as the Navy Procurement Directive (NPD).
Some Comments on Navy Procurement between World Wars
I and II.

The procurement situation in the Navy in the

period from World War I until the pre-World War II years
is rather well described by Vice Admiral Bowen who was the
Chief of the Bureau of Engineering. 4
From 1918, following the first World War, to 1933,
little progress was made in innovations in naval engineering.

There were only several ships built during this time

and they showed little or no innovations in design.

Pro-

pulsion systems clung to World War I technology and there
was little interest on the part of private shipbuilders to
introduce promising technical changes into both their
val and merchant work.

na~

This was due to several reasons;

one being the relative concentration of all government
work in one or more of three shipbuilding concerns.

These

were known as the "Big Three" and while the specifications
for naval ships were controlled by the Bureau of Engineering and Bureau of Construction and Repair, the looseness
of these guidelines permitted these companies to follow
their own design philosophies which at the time, were very
conservative.

A second reason for this situation was the

virtual death grip that Parsons Turbines Ltd., the Brit-
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ish turbine manufacturer had on marine turbines.

This

was not to say that other manufacturers were not in the
business, they were, and some making superior equipment,
but the "Big Three" shipbuilders held licenses from Parsons for the manufacture of the Parson units in their own
plants.

They were therefore quite reluctant to have this

profitable operation cease.

These reasons along with the

absence of any research facilities in the marine industry
serve to explain the lack of progress.

These specific

reasons operated in an economy that was in a depression at
the time as well, and the shipbuilding industry, in the
best of times, a feast or famine proposition, was certainly as close to its nadir as it had ever come.
Against this background, the procurement methods of
the Navy during this period can be examined briefly.

The

military characteristics of ships were determined through
the deliberations of the General Board, an advisory group
of senior naval officers which reported to the Secretary
of the Navy.

The Bureau of Construction and Repair sub-

mitted to the general board for their approval, preliminary designs which followed the characteristics determined desirable by the Board.

The Bureau of Ordnance

followed suit with plans and arrangements of armor and
armament, and the Bureau of Engineering did the machinery
arrangements, ship systems, and at that time, the elect

rorri.cs ,

1'8

Prior to requesting bids for any new naval construction, a set of specific specifications would be prepared
by the three Bureaus in the area of their responsibility.
In addition to the specifications, the Bureaus would also
prepare contract plans which would represent the specifications in a general way and show the general arrangements
of machinery, armament, and other equipments.

These

specifications and plans along with the General Specifications for Machinery, Hull t Ordnance, etc., would form
the contract package which would be made available to the
various contractors for bid purposes.
The shipbuilders would base their bids on the information contained in the design package.

They would have to

use their own engineering staffs to provide the detailed
plans or subcontract to a firm of naval architects for the
necessary plans.

There was a great deal of latitude per-

mitted the shipbUilder under this method, however no
departures for the basic design features were permitted
without the permission of the three bureaus in their area
or responsibility or in some cases from the Secretary of the
Navy when the change or deviation was of major consequence.
Needless to say, the recommendation of the Bureaus were
utilized by the Secretary in the making of his decision.

CHAPTER III
CONTRACT TYPES UTILIZED IN
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
This chapter is designed to be a quick course in the
basic types of contracts that are available to the procurement program manager.

There are, of course, more

variations than are presented herein, but there is sufficient information to allow for the reader to appreciate
just how complex the situation is and how difficult it is
to make the proper choice.

In any case, there may not be

a single best choice but the selection must be one of which
form presents the greatest advantage or the least disadvantage to the government and acceptable to the business
interests of the contractor.
FIXED PRICE CONTRACTS.

Under a firm fixed price con-

tract, a price is agreed upon before a definite contract is
awarded and remains firm for the life of the contract, unless revised pursuant to the appropriate clauses of the
contract such as changes or stop work agreements.

The con-

tractor must assume the full cost responsibility and the
ultimate profit realized is directly related to how well the
contractor manages the performance of the contract.

Fixed

price contracting is a basic form of contracting agreement
and in the formally advertised procurement method, is the

only type of contract that may be used.

With a nego-

tiated procurement, regulations direct that the fixed
price contract must be used unless, for other overbearing reasons, the use of another contract form is deemed
more appropriate.

The important thing to note is the re-

quired link between the fixed price contract form and the
advertised procurement.
Not all procurements have the necessary characteristics to permit this contract form.

It is essential that

very definite specifications be available, that some productive experience be present, and that the costs of
specification achievement through the production process
available at the contractor's plant be predictable with
certainty.

It is also essential that adequate price com-

petition exist to provide cost contrpl incentive.
Five criteria can be used for testing these procurements. l
Adequate competition has made the initial contractor proposals effective.
1.

2. Prior purchases of the same or similar supplies
or services under competitive conditions or supported by
valid cost or pricing data provide reasonable price comparisons.
3. Cost or pr~c~ng information is available, permitting the development of realistic estimates of the
probable costs of performance.
4. The uncertainties involved in contract performance can be verified and reasonable estimates of their
possible impacts on costs made, and the contractor is
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willing to accept a firm fixed price at a level which
represents assumption of a reasonable proportion of the
risk involved.
5. Any other reasonable basis consistent with the
purpose of the contract can be used to estimate pricing.
It is quite easy to accept the first three criteria
as being sound.

The fourth criterion encourages a proper

division of risk between the government and the contractor,
providing the managers on both sides can identify the risks
and negotiate, as required by the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), an agreement to do so.

The fifth

criterion is designed as a catch-all provision to permit a
fixed price contract when there is a sound assurance that
the risk is reasonable and the situation does not fit any
of the preceding four criteria.

It may happen that the

pressure of losing to competition may cause a contractor to
accept a fixed price agreement in order to achieve the
business activity.
The fixed price contract provides for the least costly administrative effort on the part of the government.
Unfortunately, only the more standard commercial, modified commercial, or repetitive buy military items can
meet the criteria for this contract form.
The fixed price contract can take several modified
forms which extends its usefulness and allow for contingencies.

These forms are fixed price escalation, fixed

price redeterminable, and fixed price incentive.
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FIXED PRICE-ESCALATION.

It may be, that with a long

run contract, the contractor may express doubt concerning the stability of the pricing agreement due to factors
over which he has no control; such as raw material costs,
labor cost, or other contingencies.

Such contingencies

can be accommodated through this type of contract by permitting the government to assume the risk.

ASPR provides

for an upward price revision ceiling to be set as a percentage of the contract price when the factors forecasting
such a risk can be identified.

The escalation clause can

and should call for a price revision downward when circumstances permit to the benefit of the government.
The escalation clause is designed to permit the
government to accept the entire risk, however payments are
tendered only upon the supported occurrence of the contingency.

Conversely, a reduction in contract price is

made only upon a downward revision in the costs to the
contractor.
FIXED PRICE INCENTIVE.

This type of contract com-

bines the fixed price technique with flexibility in
assigning responsibility for costs.

Initially, nego-

tiations set target cost, target profit, ceiling price
and a final profit formula which is designed to provide
incentive to the contractor by allowing him to share in
any undercost savings due to sound management practice
2~

which he might employ, and conversely to involve the contractor in defraying any overrun on target cost.

This

method of contracting also satisfies many of the conditions
for the fixed price redeterminable form discussed in the
following section.
FIXED PRICE REDETERMINABLE.
ations of this type of contract.

There are several variRedetermination of pricing

can be solely prospective (before contract performance) in
application, retroactive (after contract performance), or
a combination system (during performance).

The similari-

ties to the incentive type contract are that first, a
ceiling price has been negotiated initially, and secondly,
at the agreed time of price revision. the contractor makes
available actual, audited performance data from the contract under review or from other similar contracts to the
Government negotiating team.
One very significant difference is that unlike incentive contracts in which the degree of contractor cost
responsibility is determined initially through development of a formula, the fixed price redeterminable contract
does not provide for a determination of the contractor's
share in any price revision until the time for redetermination negotiations has been reached.

This difference is

important in that the negotiations for both cost and profit

considerations at this point of redetermination are of
such importance to the contractor that it is highly unlikely that he will concede any allegations of deficient
cost control when the costs have already been incurred.
The result, for both the government and the contractor is
that demonstratable proof of either outstanding or extremely bad management can not be presented and a grey
area exists in the negotiations.

For this reason this

form is not recommended for use except when the following
conditions holdt

1. Adequate estimates of quantities of material are
not initially available.
2. Specifications adequate for firm fixed price contracts are not initially available.
3. Sound initial estimates of total cost of performance cannot be made.
4. Effective competition or other reasonable
justification of cost is not available.
5. The use of price redetermination would materially assist in effecting fair and reasonable pricing.
At the redetermination point, the contractor is required to submit a breakdown of costs actually incurred and
the best estimate of costs expected to be incurred during
the remainder of the contract run.

This and other data

such as a government audit, form the basis upon which negotiations are held.

Regulations permit the contracting
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officer to take into account all performance factors,
both positive and negative, which characterize the contractors efforts up to the redetermination point.
COST TYPE CONTRACTS.

The cost type contract is

designed chiefly for use in research and development situations involving great technical complexity with the
attendant difficulty in predicting the cost of performance.

Such uncertainties would make the precise defi-

nition by specification of the scope of work involved an
impossibility.

The cost type contract permits the govern-

ment to undertake high technology development projects
with essentially no risk being placed with the contractor.
Several particular variations of cost type contracts are
in use; the cost plus fixed fee (CPFF), the cost plus incentive fee (CPIF), and the time and materials contracts.
COST PLUS FIXED FEE.

As the title implies, the cost

plus fixed fee type of contract obligates the government to
pay all costs incurred and a fixed fee or profit is paid,
generally based upon a percentage of the costs, or in other
words, the scope of the work undertaken.
The difficulties in administering a contract of this
kind are reasonably obvious.

First, the contractor must

demonstrate that his accounting system is adequate to determine the costs applicable to the contracts, and secondly,
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he must be willing to undergo careful government scrutiny of bis data and procedures.

Problems arising from

these causes have resulted in legitimate concern on the
part of the goverruaent about the use of the CPFF as a
contracting form.

Experience has shown that the incen-

tives for cost control are not present and alternatives
yielding cost advantages to the government are not explored nor are they followed.

The generally acknowledged

experience from thes. contracts has been higher than
anticipated costs.

So. . estimates are unr.allstlc and

unilateral in nature, and thus poor comparisona, others
have been carefully adjusted figures which have considered all new work, scope modificationa and the like.
The result has been about the same degree of over-run.
The basic underlying reason for this poor performance is
thought to be an absence of real cost responsibility on
the part of the contractor.

The contractual agreement is

reached with a target cost beyond which the govertllllent
will not be liable.

This limit may be greater than, equal

to, or less than the eost originally estimated.

The con-

tractor in thi8 situation, is morally bound to make his
best management efforts to remain within this estimate but
he is not under legal obligation to meet these limits.
When the limit of funding is reached, the contractor ceases
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work and is not obligated to complete unless further contractual arrangements are made.

The contractor's fee is

paid no matter what his performance on the contract.
Currently, the services are restricted from utilizing
the CPFF contract types except when all of the following
conditions prevails
1. A cost reimbursement type of contract is found to
be necessary in accordance with the ASPR.

2. The contracting parties agree that the contract
should be fee bearing.
3. The contract is for the performance of research,
or preliminary exploration and study, in which the level
of effort required is unknown.
4. The contract is for development and test effort
for which the ~se of a Cost Plus Incentive Fee contract is
not practical.
The CPFF type contract is prohibited from use in the
development of major weapons systems and equipment once
preliminary exploration and studies have indicated an
acceptably high degree of probability that the development
is feasible and the desired performance parameters and time
schedule have been established by the government.
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Procurement law (10 USC 2306(d»

limits the fee for

performing a CPFF contract in various technical areas.
The fee limitations are given in Table I.
TABLE I

CPFF CONTRACT TYPES AND MAXIMUM FEES
Tasking

Fee

Experimental Development
and research work.

15% of the estimated cost
of the contract less the fee.

Architectural or engineering services for public works
or utilities.

6% of the estimated cost of
the contract less the fee.

Contract in any other category appropriate for a CPFF
type.

10& of the estimated cost of
ahe contract less the fee.

Source, W. H. Riemer, Handbook of Gove[IUIlent Co.ntract
Administration (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1968,
p. 277.
There are two basic forms of CPFF contracts, the 'completion' form and the 'term' form.

As the qualifier 'com-

pletion' suggests, this type of contract is for a clearly
defined scope of work which should be completed with
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the preparation of a final report, the contractor having
fulfilled the requirements of the tasking document.

If

the contractor has not done this, it is within the option
of the government to renew 'completion' type contracts if
renewal is deemed to be in the government interest.
'Term' contracts specify a particular level of effort to
be expended for a given time or term and the fee is paid
upon completion of this effort after the government is
satisfied that the contractor has fulfilled the requirements.

If additional work is required, an entirely new

contract may be formulated.

In most cases, the 'completion'

form of the CPFF contract is preferred.
It is possible to have a cost type contract without
fees, defined simply as a cost reimbursable type.

This

is a useful form in contracting with universities and
other non-profit institutions.
Another variation which is useful is the costr-sharing
type of contract by means of which the government and
industry can jointly share in a research and development
effort.

This is an effective varient but is only accept-

able when the contractor views the result of the effort
as having a high probability of commercial spin-off which
may benefit his product line.
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COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE.

This is a cost plus type

of contract which is adjusted by a formula following completion of the task.

Negotiations set a target cost, a

target fee, and upper and lower fee limits.

A fee ad-

justment formula is also agreed upon to fix the fee within
the upper and lower limits.

After performance of the

contract, the fee is determined in accordance with the
formula and the contractor's demonstrated effort to meet
the negotiated targets.

Technical performance on the con-

tract is also a determining factor.
TIME AND MATERIALS CONTRACT.

This is a cost plus

type of contract which can be used for the procurement of
services and supplies.

Charges are based upon a direct

hourly labor charge at a negotiated rate and materials used
at cost.

Various exclusions can be negotiated as can a

ceiling which can not be exceeded except at the risk of
the contractor.

This is not a good contract form and is

usually avoided, being utilized only if a relatively short
contract life is anticipated or if an emergency situation
exists.

The Navy generally procures special diving and

salvage services through this contract form.
SPECIAL CONTRACT FORMS.

There are five special types

of contract forms which are useful.

These are:

LETTER CONTRACTS
INDEFINITE DELIVERY CONTRACTS
BASIC AGREEMENT
OPEN CONTRACT 4
SMALL PURCHASES
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A brief discussion of these contract formats follows.
LETTER CONTRACT.

The letter contract, though not

a desirable contract form from the point of view of either
the government or contractor, is nevertheless, a very
important and much utilized device.
ASPR 3 - 408 defines a letter contract ass
" a written preliminary contractual instrument which
authorizes immediate commencement of manufacture of
supplies and procurement of services including but
not limited to pre-production planning and the procurement of necessary materials." S
Because of the undesirability of this contract form as
a business device, the use of it is restricted to situations where in the interest of national defense, the
contractor must immediately be given a binding commitment
such that the work may be started at once, or when there is
insufficient time to complete negotiation of a definitive
contract due to the urgent requirement to proceed with a
procurement.

Many procurements are developed under the

second category when there is not sufficient definition of
the project to develop necessary cost data, definition of
concept, etc. and the letter contract will permit a start
work condition such that the necessary data can be provided as a result of the early effort against the letter
contract.
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When a letter contract is utilized for either of the
above two procurement patterns, there must be adequate
assurance that the negotiations can be resolved in a
proper manner and not be the cause of problems or delay.
To accomplish this, there are specific rules which must
be followed in constructing the letter contract.

Be-

cause this contract is so frequently used as a preliminary
form in a large procurement, specific rules in format apply:
1. The contractor must immediately proceed with the
performance of the contract and may provide raw materials.
2.
The extent and method of payment for termination
of the contract shall be agreed upon. Termination may be
either based upon the convenience of the Government or default.
3. The maximum liability of the letter contract shall
be agreed upon and the contractor shall not be permitted
to expend funds against the contract beyond that amount as
specified.
4. The form of the definitive contract shall be
agreed upon.
5. There will be agreement on as many definitive
contract clauses as can be obtained and these shall become a part of the letter contract.
6. The extent of the contractor's effort in providing cost and pricing data will be agreed upon and
defined by the letter contract as determined to be reasonable by the negotiators.
7. A good faith agreement between the government
and the contractor shall be established to ensure the
most rapid possible negotiation period in converting t~e
letter contract into an executed definitized contract.

Letter contracts are time limited as well, with the
conversion process to be completed within 180 days of the
agreement or at the 40% point in the performance of the
contract, whichever might come first.
Under the provisions of a cost plus fee type of letter contract, no fees can be paid prior to definitizing
the contract.

Under a fixed price type of contract, pro-

gress payments may be made, however the aggregate of all
progress payments made can not exceed 70% of the value of
the letter contract.
It is possible, upon agreement of the parties involved,
to definitize a letter contract in another form if such
action is desirable.

Expenditures by the contractor be-

yond the limits of the amount funded by the contract are
not permitted unless the government elects to increase the
contract amount for any reason deemed to be justifiable.
Terminations are effected in accordance with the general
provisions governing termination for convenience of the
government as prescribed by ASPR.
The letter contract is a valuable contract form and
much used in the procurement of ships, but on the other
hand, it is not a good form for either the buyer or the
contractor.

The advantage to the government is the speed

of the arrangement and the fact that the contractor's cost

data can be available prior to the final negotiation.

The

disadvantages are that there is no incentive for the contractor to perform proper cost control functions and he is
under no obligation to completely fulfill the contract until the contract is definitized as rapidly as possible.
BASIC AGREEMENT.

The basic agreement is not a con-

tract in and of itself, but rather is a contractual device
to set forth those basic contract clauses which could be
considered standard clauses in all contracts negotiated
between the government and a contractor.

This device is

used primarily for establishing a basis upon which to save
time in making procurement actions with contractors with
whom many repeat actions are taken.

This tool would not be

used in major procurements, but would be useful in procurement of repetitive items and consumables.
INDEFINITE DELIVERY CONTRACTS.

An indefinite de-

livery type contract is similar to the basic agreement in
that all the negotiations are complete except for the final
establishing of quantity and delivery dates.

The contract

may call for pricing on a firm fixed price, price escalation, or price redeterminable basis.
This is a useful contract form in making procurements
where the requirement for the material procured is well
known but the quantity and time for delivery has not yet
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been definitized.

Use of this form would be restricted

primarily to stock replenishment of supplies such as consumables and spares where the time for delivery is not
yet clearly defined.

Major weapons systems would not be

procured utilizing this form, but it would be a useful
contract type in the procurement of follow-on spares.
All such contracts are time limited, the length of
the effective period being determined by mutual agreement
between the government and the contractor.

The time peri-

ods vary, being a maximum in a rising market situation
and the shortest in a falling market.

By so controlling

the time of a contract, the government may theoretically
take advantage of the most attractive price.

Another way

this is done is to negotiate an appropriate escalation
clause which can achieve the same result in a long term
contractual situation.

Unfortunately, there are few cir-

cumstances when the escalation clause will operate in
reverse, and when the negotiator for the Government expects a falling price situation due to production efficiencies or process improvements, it is to his advantage
to set the time limitation relatively short.
Indefinite delivery contracts can be formulated in
three distinct ways, one may require a definite quantity
of material without stating delivery, the second may state

clearly the requirement for both quantity and overall
time for performance, and the third type may state only
an indefinite quantity.

In all cases, an estimated total

quantity is provided for use by the contractor.
OPEN CONTRACT.

This contract form is also termed

the master type or task order contract.

It is used ex-

tensively in the ship repair business where firms which
qualify to hold master ship repair contracts may negotiate
a basic agreement with the Naval Ship Systems Command upon
which the various Supervisor's of Shipbuilding, Construction
and Repair may base definitized contracts for repair and
overhaul of ships.

These contracts do not obligate the

government to procure any supplies and services during the
tenure of the contract.

No pricing data is contained in

the contract however a provision on pricing is included to
cover methods by which pricing may be effected.

An ex-

cellent model of the open contract form is a basic agreement under which an indefinite number of letter contracts
can be issued to definitize the basic agreement.
As mentioned, this contract is very useful for the
procurement of repair parts and repair work where repetitive procurements are made from a single or only several
sources of supply, usually confined to a definite geographical area.

The advantage of this type of system is
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that particularly rapid procurements can be effected.

In

the case of ship repair, a group of ship surveyors from
the office of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Construction
and Repair visit the ship to undergo the repair work and
develop a written scope on the work that is to be accomplished.

This effort, completed in just several days time,

is then given to the holders of the master ship repair
contracts in a given geographical area for their review.
Bids are received several days later and the award for the
repairs made to the low bidder within the framework of the
other contract requirements.

It is possible to have re-

pairs started within several days of the arrival of the
vessel, thus minimizing the period of time any ship is not
available for operations.
This procedure, it must be recognized, is only useful
in the present day for the repair of non-complex ships and
ship systems.

Ships in this category are limited to older

auxiliary types, amphibious types, and replenishment ships.
Small boats and yard craft may also be cared for in this
manner.

This system is seldom used for combatants or com-

plex ships of any type unless emergency conditions compel
that it be done.

In other types of procurement, pricing may be developed from standard catalogs, or through experience midway
through the production run of an item manufactured in response to a basic task order.
SMAI.I.

PURCHASES.

This is not technically a contract

form, but is an important authority granted to government
contracting officers by the ASPR to make agreements for the
purchase of items which do not aggregate more than $2500
in cost.

These purchases can be proprietary and on the

open market, and this technique is often used to buy specific repair parts known to be of superior quality and performance than others obtained under competitive action.
The limits on total value do very much

restr~ct

the use-

fulness of the technique but it still has great use in the
ship repair business.
This form can be used for nonpersonal services and for
construction as well as for spares.

It does not preclude

the use of formal contract negotiations if such are deemed
advisable by the contracting officer.
Summary.

Table II is provided as a summation of the

range of contract types and the theoretical advantages and
disadvantages of each to the government and the contractor.
As it will later be shown, the trend is to the incentive
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type contract for most major procurements.

The key in

the contract choice will generally be the type which permits the best management of the risk, both that which is
known and that which might at the time of decision, be
unknown.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
Background.

No essay on the military-industrial

complex, the so termed relationship between the defense
establishment and the industrial capability which, through
business arrangements, is supportive of the military services in hardware, consumables, and ideas, can be considered complete without a reference to the statement made by
President Eisenhower on 17 January 1961 as he prepared to
leave office.

The statement he made on that occasion has

been frequently quoted and often in a manner which is not
sufficiently complete to avoid being misled from the content of the comment.

He said in parts

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United
States had no armaments industry. American makers
of plowshares could with time and as required, make
swords as well.
But we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense. We have been compelled to
create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three-and-a half million
men and women are directly engaged in the defense
establishment. We annually spend on military security alone more than the net annual income of all
United States corporations.
Now this conjunction
establishment and a large
the American experience.
economic, political, even
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of an immense military
arms industry is new in
The total influence-spiritual--is felt in

every city, every statehouse, every office of the
Federal Government. We recognize the imperative
need for this development. Yet we must not fail
to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil,
resources, and livelihood are all involved; so is
the very structure of our society.
In the councils of Government, we must guard
against the acquisition of unwarranted influence,
whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disasterous
rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. l
Critics of the defense establishment are quick to
use this statement by a former President as a basis for
launching an attack on what is characterized as a monstrous organizational matrix operated by irresponsible and
greedy individuals, each
ces.

perp~tuating

the others worst vi-

Certainly we can quickly ref4te the "Dr. Strangelove"

image as being far from the truth, yet the concern over the
military-industrial complex continues to exist and occupies considerable space in the press and attention from
other news media.

The legislative branch of the Govern-

ment is also very concerned as are economists and commentators on the social processes. 2
Well known names among legislators have spoken out
against the military-industrial complex.

Senator William

Proxmire, as chairman of the Joint Economic Committee is a
loud and forceful critic of the defense procurement system.

He says:
I speak today not~to warn against some future danger
of this influence: I assert that, whether sought or
unsought, there is today unwarranted influence by the
military-industrial complex resulting in excessive
costs, burgeoning military budgets, and scandalous
performances. The danger has long since materialized
with a r~vaging effect on our nation's spending priorities.
Later in the same address, Senator Proxmire goes on
to say:

"The problem of defense spending is out of control.

The military-industrial complex writes its own ticket.,,4
Throughout, the Senator voices his concern about the
delivery schedule of weapons systems, the level of profits
in the defense industry. the type of contracts employed,
the excessive costs of systems, alleged poor cost control,
quality control and thus makes queries into many areas of
the procurement process.

At the root of this inquiry,

Senator Proxmire points to the cause, the military-industrial complex.

.
1S

";'(

The term

I •

1nfluence' as used here by Senator Proxmire

e~actly ~nalogous to the influence against which former
Pre~1dent E1senhower warned.
The warning is thought to be
aga~nst the power exercised by military, political and
bus1ne~s.int~re~ts wh~Ch might bring a steady progression

to a m111tar1st1c soc1ety.

He says on that points
The connections between the military, on the one
hand, and the major industries which supply it, on
the other, are very close and very cooperative.
The result of all this is a system which is not
only inefficient but is now literally out of cont:ol.
Excessive amounts are spent on overhead and suppl~es.
Huge cost over-runs are standard occurrences. Weapons systems routinely do not
the standards and
3meet
specifications set for them.
Thus does the Senator drive through to what he considers the heart of the matter.

Time after time, he

assails the complex as an unweildy and. unresponsive mechanisms
At the present time, it is not inaccurate or unfair
to describe the United States' weapons acquisition
system as a kind of welfare system for the military
brass and the Department of Defense bureaucracy on
the one hand, and the top aerospace and munitions
manufacturers on the other. Instead of a defense
production system geared to supply military needs
with all possible dispatch and economy, we have a
Pentagon procurement system that weakens, rather
than strengthens, us. It saps our economic resources. It promotes inflation. It misuses our
skilled manpower. It wastes the energies and
genius of our engineers, scientists, and intellectuals, while 6echnical and academic research is
misdirected.
These charges are quite serious and within the Department of Defense, a great deal of effort has been and
will be continuously expended to identify and correct the
failures of the procurement systems, thus giving some
credit to the basis of these allegations.

There has yet

to be established if there is a military-industrial com;nfluence which former President Eisenhower
plex and i f t h e •
warned about is actually abroad in the land. In order to
present some insight into this question, the matter of
national priorities and the profile of the defense industry will be examined.
Changing National Priorities and the Military-Industrial Complex.

One of the sounding themes of the Sub-

committee on Economy in Government has been the current
balance between military and oivilian spending.

Citing

the problems in America's larger cities, racial problems,
problems of ethnic minorities, problems of pollution,
housing shortages, unemployment, inter alia, the Subcommittee points to the defense budget and the Department of
Defense as a culpable partner in these ills.*
Since World War II, the defense of the United States
has taken the largest share of the Federal budget and has
represented one of the top national priorities.

Two dis-

tinct spending peaks, one in 1953 during the Korean War

~

"These charges were made by Senator Proxmire in a
statement before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government on June 3, 1969. U. S. Congress, Joint Economic
Committee, Subcommittee on Economy in Government, The
Military Budget and National Economic Priorities: ~ar
ings, 9lst Congress, 1st sess., 3 June 1969, pt. I, p. 1.
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and one in 1968 during the height of the conflict in southeast Asia mark the periods of maximum attention to defense
as the first priority.
The noted economist, John Kenneth Galbraith makes the
following point when speaking of the element of fear to
which large defense expenditures respond:
It is now even agreed as to where the first danger.
to American democracy--if there is one--lies. It ~s
not from the Soviet Union or China. The first danger
is from the starvation of our public serviges, particularly in our big cities, here at home.
One might not agree on the classification of 'first
danger' by Mr. Galbraith, as he does not support the point,
but there is no doubt that the greater number of cities have
serious problems with the rising cost of public services, a
fact made obvious by the large number of public comments
made calling for Federal aid in meeting these bills.
Dr. Charles Schultze, former Director of the Bureau
of the Budget and presently a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution has suggested to the Proxmire committee
that there might be available, following the decline of the
Vietnam war effort, 20 billion dollars once committed to
defense spending that could be utilized for domestic programs.

Taking into account a progressive growth in Federal

revenues of 15 billion dollars yearly due to economic expansion and a seven billion dollar growth in expenditures

~6

due to escalation and inflation in addition to the normal
expansion of existing programs, he projected that in 1974
some 55 billion dollars could be available for new programs. 8

These monies would mark the shift from an un-

popular emphasis on national security to more popular
domestic programs of greater contemporary priority.
When Dr. Schultze gave his testimony in 1969, he was
speaking in terms of what might happen.

A review of what

has occurred in the several years since his prediction is
informative.

Table I I I presents the impact of these

changing priorities from defense purposes to domestic pursuits in both current dollars and in constant 1972 dollars.
Of some significance is the change in defense spending from FY 1964 to FY 1968 when contrasted with the
spending trends since FY 1968, the peak year of the Southeast Asia effort.

The net difference in constant 1972

dollars is an increase of two tenths of a billion dollars.
The growth of other Federal spending has been phenomenal,
totaling 68.3 billion dollars.

Added to the growth of

state and local spending of some 58.6 billion dollars, an
overall increase in nondefense appropriations of 126.9
billion dollars has been realized over the eight year span
from 1964 to 1972.

The effect of inflation and the increasing personnel
costs can be seen by examining the data in current dollars.

'+7

The increase of 25.2 billion dollars over the period
FY 1964 to FY 1972 unfortunately does not add that much
in the aggregate but represents essentially the reaction
of the budget to inflationary pressures.

Other Federal,

state, and local spending suffered similar growth, but as
comparison with the constant dollar data shows, did result in a net increase in funds to procure goods and
services.

When compared with the 55 billion dollars pro-

jected by Dr. Schultze, the realized 68.3 billion dollar
increase exceeds that figure by 13.3 billion dollars.

It

is of further significance to note that this occurred after
three years instead of the predicted five.
The changes in the labor allocation to defense pursuits are also helpful in gaining a perspective of the
change in priorities.

Overall, the defense industry has

dropped in employment by 2.5 million and other activity
gained 8.9 million employees since 1968.

Essentially all

the personnel buildup for the Vietnam conflict has been
returned to the civilian sector and an additional 276,000
have been added beyond that for good measure.
Lest there be some doubt that these figures are
weighted to the advantage of the non-defense sector, a
review of the statement made by the Honorable Robert P.
Mayo, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, before the

Subcommittee on Economy in Government tends to corroborate this later data presented by the Secretary of
Defense.
Speaking of the decade spanning from 1959 to 1969,
Mr. Mayo saysl
Despite an absolute increase of 34.4 billion dollars,
from 46.6 billion dollars in Fiscal Year 1959 to
81 billion dollars in Fiscal Year 1969, total outlays for national defense have declined steadily as
a percentage of the budget outlay. The absolute increase includes 28.8 billion dollars to support our
southeast Asia operations.
Outlays for civilian programs have increased by
53.4 billion dollars • • • • Over 70% of the increase
has been for human resource programs • • • • The pery twice
centage for civilian programs has been
as great as that for national defense. 9near1
As the national priorities change to develop administration programs in the areas of health, education,
manpower, housing, income maintenance, pollution control,
and community development, the relative resource which
supports the defense industry will grow smaller and eventually, it seems safe to predict, there may be a hea1theducation-we1fare-industria1 complex.

The emphasis in

the area of the humanities will draw contractor interest
to these topical areas and the growth will parallel the
pattern of the past for the defense industry.
The Military-Industrial Complexl
defense industry.

A profile of the

This discussion of the defense oriented

industry presumes that the reader has a reasonable awareness
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of the public systems in the Department of Defense which
to a certain extent parallel the management structure implemented in industry.

This is particularly true since the

project manager technique has been implemented within the
Department of Defense. 10
The emphasis of this chapter will be placed upon some
factors which pertain wholly to the defense industrial base.
Factors such as corporate size, geographic dependency on defense spending, distribution of defense employment and labor
force, defense contract awards and payrolls, and profit expectations serve as important indicators of the defense
industry profile.
In discussing the industrial base, it is appropriate
to look at the experience of the largest and most active of
those firms engaged in the business of defense.

Table IV

presents the prime military contract awards in the time
period 1960-1967 to the top 25 companies engaged in the defense business.

Of the five firms with the largest total

defense business, four have defense sales which total more
than 50% of their gross sales.

Applying the 50% criteria

to the entire group of firms, only 14 do more than 50% of
their sales in the domestic market and of those 14, seven
transact between 15 and 50% of their total business in
defense sales.
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procurement, it is indeed a factor as some 1.242 billion
dollars are in dispute concerning four programs.

The pro-

grams involved are the rocket propulsion system for the
SRAM* and the C-SA for the Air Force, the Cheyenne helicopter for the Army, and several shipbuilding programs for
the Navy.

As the settlements of these claims are worked out,

it is estimated that Lockheed will accept as losses, some
447 million dollars in claimed development and production
costs.1 2
At the other end of the scale, General Motors Corporation and General Electric Corporation do, respectively,
only two and nineteen percent of their total corporate sales
value in the defense sector.

The massive size of their

organizations is apparent when one considers the value of
defense contracts these firms hold.

General Electric ranks

fifth as a prime contract winner and General Motors ranks
eleventh, yet their diversity and size permits great market strength, both in the domestic and defense sectors.
It is also of interest to observe the relatively even
distribution of contract awards to those firms occupying
10th through 20th position.

Over the seven year span of

?"SRAM is an acronym for a new air to surf ace Short
Range Attack Missile.
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the table, only one billion dollars in awards separated
the 10th ranked contractor from the 20th ranking.

This

contrasts directly to the almost seven billion difference
be tweeri the first and the ninth ranked firm.
There is no correspondence between relative ranking
and the percent of total sales in the defense sector.

This

is a widely varient figure, from a low of two percent to a
high of 88%.
Geographic Distribution.

Another way in which the

defense industry can be profiled is through geographic distribution.

Table V presents the defense contract awards

and payrolls by states for the three year period 1965
through 1967.

Examination of the contract awards column

for 1967 reveals that there are twelve states where the
total of awards exceed one billion dollars.

Some of these

top ranking states support a large domestic industrial concentration and a high value for defense work is not a
surprise.

States in this category are California, New York,

New Jersey, Texas, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Michigan and Ohio.

A heavy concentration of defense indus-

try in the industrialized northeast would be a natural
conclusion.
It is interesting to examine some of the other states
with over one billion dollars in contract awards.

Cal-

ifornia ranks first in the nation with over 17.6 billion
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dollars in cumulative awards in the three year period.
A study made in 1965 of the regional impact of defense
spending on the economy of California concluded that because of an early concentration of the aircraft industry
in the state and the remarkable growth of that industry
during World War II, there was a natural supply and demand relationship which contributed to the meteoric increase in the demographic element through the development
of new jobs and high salaries. 13 Los Angeles County alone
saw an influx of some 1,171,000 people in the decade beginning in 1950.

A crude estimate of the dependency of

the population on the defense industry is made by James
Clayton in his book, The Economic Impact of the Cold War.
He says:
The Census Bureau in its special report on manufacturing for that year (1963), which included thirty
industrial categories but excluded government-owned
plants, placed the defense employment figure at
407,500 (for the entire state) with 54% of these
workers in the Los Angeles-Long Beach area and 12%
each for the San Jose and San Diego areas. If these
direct defense jobs support two additional indirect
jobs--a crude but conservative assumption--over a
million and a half workers or about one-third of all
non-agricultural employees in California in recent
years have been dependent on continued defense expenditures. 14
California also enjoyed the insight of its industry
for as the aircraft demand was reduced, the companies
turned to research and development and were immediately

involved in the space programs sponsored by NASA.

Ad-

ditionally, the loss of jobs in the aircraft industry
was more than compensated for by the introduction of jobs
in the electrical/electronics research and manufacturing.
Instead of a net loss in jobs, there was an employment
increase of some 60% using 1957, the year of the cutback
in aircraft production as a baseline. 15
It is interesting to note that California is a coastal state and enjoys a climate in the southwestern sector
which is highly conducive to attracting residents from
other, less temperate areas of the country.

There is no

doubt that this enviable asset played an important role
in the original location of the aircraft industry in that
region and in the steady growth of the industry once foundedt

It has been advanced that the federal government has
always viewed the western littoral and the mountain states
with greater favor,than the remaining two-thirds of the
country, due largely to the more recent history of that
area.

Thus much of the irrigation and flood control pro-

jects, railroad land grants, land development projects, etc.
were government sponsored in more recent time and the momentum from the growth stimulated by these efforts is still
being enjoyed. 16
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The number two state in the defense industry is also
a coastal state.

Texas moved ahead of New York in 1967 as

a result of the final phases of the TFX!F-lll contract
awarded to General Dynamics.

New York enjoys third place

in overall contract value, with Missouri, on the strength
of the McDonnell-Douglas operation near St. Louis, in
fourth place.

Connecticut, another coastal state, is fifth.

Of the twelve states with over one billion dollars in
contract awards, eight are coastal states.

This has two

possible implications, one, that the early industrial development took place near sea lanes of transportation, a
fact in general more true for the east coast than the west,
and as already presented in the discussion on California,
the favorable climate and attractive recreation potential
of the southwestern coast has been particularly successful
in attracting heavy concentrations of late developing defense industry, particularly aircraft, aerospace, electronics, electrical, and research oriented firms.

These

types of industries, being technology intensive, employ
large numbers of skilled and highly trained personnel who
place a high value on leisure time activities.

These in-

dividuals are usually able to command a premium wage and
with the opportunities for extra pay for overtime generally available from defense contracts, earnings in the

fense sector are quite high.

The high cost of develop-

able land near the coast for dwellings is therefore not a
severe deterrent and particularly on the western coast.
the combination of the coastal zone and the coastal mountain range offer a nearly complete spectrum of recreational
activities.
The relatively 'clean' nature of the industry is
generally compatible with the coastal zone and can therefore be assured of community acceptance.

Aviation is not

free from pollutants by a long measure. but electronics.
airframes and parts. the aerospace oriented industries.
and in particular. the research or

'think~tank'

opera-

tion have not faced the severe pollution problems of the
heavy industry concentrated on the eastern seaboard.
One must also mention the consistent good flying
weather which is prevalent in the Gulf Coast and West
Coast regions.

In the formative days of aviation when

visual reference was required. these areas would be natural choices for the related support industry.
Another interesting comment could be made regarding
this coastal concentration.

Many of the plant facilities

built up during World War II were government financed or
built on public land.

These plant facilities were direct-

ed into existing centers of population both with respect
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to the location of a skilled labor force and in some
cases to areas of high labor force availability.

The

Lockheed complex at Atlanta represents one such concentration, the NASA complex in the New Orleans region
is another.
As a final note, availability of capital is important.

Such capital in the form of a sympathetic banking

system proved to be an important element in the success
of the Route 128 complex in Boston.1 7
The political influence.

The political influence

and geographic distribution are highly related areas of
consideration.

It is submitted that much of the poli-

tical influence does not receive the attention of the
general public, and is good or bad depending upon one's
geographical orientation and point of view.

The unfortu-

nate TFX program had political overtones which were presented by the McClellan Committee in their report on the
TFX contract investigation.

The report concluded in part

regarding the political roles played by the secretarial
level decision makers.
Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric was guilty
of a flagrant conflict of interest in the TFX award.
The record shows unequivocally that he deliberately
attempted to mislead the subcommittee regarding his
relationship with the General Dynamics Corp. as it
existed before he accepted the appointment as Deputy
Secretary and that he tried to equate the relation-
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ship with a small part he once played in a Boeing
case. The record makes clear the fact that he was
a top level policy counselor to General Dynamics
for the two and one-half years immediately before
his appointment and that he was a de facto member
of the company's board of directors. The record
shows that he participated in the TFX award proceedings and that he advised Secretary McNamara to
give the contract to General Dynamics • • • • He
obViously should have disqualified himself from
taking any part in the decision. 18
Similar though less damaging statements were made regarding the role played by the Secretary of the Navy
Fred B. Korth,19 and in turn by the other principals,
Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert and Secretary of Defense McNamara.

Most observers of the Defense Department

view this decision as the symbolic wresting of the decision authority away from the senior military advisors and
concentrating such authority into the hands of the civilian
secretariat.

The committee view on this was presented by

Senator Henry Jackson who said.
• • • I think it is in the interest of a Secretary
that he have these checks and balances with him at
all times. It puts him in the position of being able
to say with assurance that While we all err, and we
all make mistakes, that he is backed up and fortified by a system of checks and balances, a system in
which many, ~any people participate and no one person
is absolute. 20
As another more fortunate saga of political influence,
one might consider the development of the large and modern
Shipbuilding complex in Pascagoula, Mississippi by Litton
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Ship Systems in production planning for multiple units of
standard design ships.

This facility will soon be employed

in producing two of the Navy's newest ship designs, the LHA,
an amphibious assault ship, and the DD-963, a multi-purpose destroyer type.

Five and 30 ships respectively, will

be constructed. 21
The award of the 00-963 oontract to Litton was made
on 24 June 1970.

This particular award is of interest from

the point of view of the geographically motivated political
interaction.

In making announcement of the award, New York

Times writer Juan Vasquez described the situation as a
"delicate political problem."22

Maine Senator Margaret Chase

Smith is a ranking minority member of the Armed Services
Committee, and with the Bath Iron Works Corporation of Bath,
Maine a very close second in the contract competition, the
roles played by Senator Smith and Senator John Stennis of
Mississippi, the chairman of the committee were bound to
be in strong opposition.

The influence of Mrs. Smith could

beseen in her support of an amendment proposed by Representative Louis C. Wyman, New Hampshire, which passed the
House of Representatives.

This amendment was designed to

require the contract to be split and construction of the 30
ships would be by law, acoomplished in two different shipyards. 23

(It is presumed of course, that one of the ship-
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yards would be that of the Bath Iron Works Corp. because
of their close standing in the competition.)

Her vocal

support for the General Accounting Office investigation
which was initiated at her request following a Bath Iron
Works Corporation protest of the circumstances if the contract award was aimed directly at discrediting the extremely careful source selection and review procedures conducted
by the Navy and the Department of Defense.

The amendment

was rejected by Senate vote and the contract award was
cleared by the General Accounting Office in the final
analysis. 24
As a standing courtesy to members of Congress, the
Department of Defense follows the practice of first notifying the member of Congress from the affected district of
an impending contract award to a firm in that district.
This practice permits the Congressman, if he wishes, to advise his constituents of the award prior to public announcement.

Political interest in the Defense Department's

activities is real, probing, and often demanding.
The Defense Industry:

A View of the Financial Profile.

It is probably an understatement to say that the defense
industry is anything but static.

In this age of burgeon-

ing technology, a weapons system may be moving off the
production line one minute and be rendered instantly
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obsolete by a concept or sketch on a draftsman's board the
next minute.

Greater systems performance has been con-

stant1y a primary goal and complementary technology is
being sought out to match each advance in the fields of
electronics, propulsion, etc., to achieve an integrated
system without enhancing obsolescence.

The technical ef-

fort needed to develop and produce these weapons systems
has increased at a geometric rate.

As a measure of this

increase, the Defense Department's budget for research and
development increased from 2.9 billion dollars in 1955 to
5.2 billion dollars actually expended in FY 1971.

A fur-

ther increase of one billion each year for FY 72 and 73
is programmed in the budget. 25
Capital investment has been a new requirement for the
defense contractor who would be competitive in the defense
business as technical requirements have become progressively
more demanding.

Additional plant facilities may be neces-

sary; new laboratories, new tooling and plant equipment, and
modernized existing facilities in order to keep pace with
the most advanced production methods are not luxuries but
essential to competitive success as well as to the industrial mobilization base.

This problem is not one for the
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industry alone, but a great many actions and policy decisions of the Department of Defense are influenced by the
forecast of a desirable impact on the capability of the
defense industry.26
Employment patterns have changed to support a more
technology intense enterprise.

Firms engaged in the de-

fense sector have increased the number of scientists and
engineers in their employ.

Further, the nature of the

various technical disciplines that have become necessary to
the defense contractor,--electronics, nuclear physics, the
aerospace sciences, missile and rocket technology--, each
demand their own administrative organization which is specialized through the broad spectrum of research, development,
test, and production facilities, materials science, design
expertise, production equipments and methods.
Competitive superiority is difficult to acquire and even
more difficult to maintain.

This causes serious risks to be

involved from the expenditure of funds to constantly improve plant facilities and equipment, incorporate the newest
and most effective management innovations, engage in independent research and development, upgrade the skills of
employees, and otherwise take actions which will advance the
firm capabilities.
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Management must therefore be capable of accurate assessment of the customer's advanced requirements in order
to be prepared and in a competitive posture.*

This en-

tails estimation of the 'unk-unks', the unknown-unknowns
which proliferate in the major 'fringe technology' weapons
development programs and do so much to make the procurement
of these systems a high risk evolution. 27 Most defense
contractors will agree that this area represents the most
vexing and perhaps the least understood area in the acquisition of weapons systems.
In view of the present defense market consideration,
the high cost of major weapon systems has limited the number
that can be procured and greater effectiveness is hoped for
to limit the number of units required.

The strategy followed

by the defense contractor has been to rely on high quality.

*The Navy attempts to ease this risk through the conduct of a series of briefings sponsored by the Naval
Material Command under the title of the Advanced Planning
Briefings for Industry. During this week of meetings, held
on an annual basis, engineers, scientists, and managers of
the Naval Material Command make presentations to representatives of industry covering the latest trends and developments which might have a bearing on weapons systems in which
the Navy is interested. From these briefings, industry can
infer areas of independent incentive for research, development or technology spin~off for their companies.
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Besides quality and ontime delivery, firms are also under
strong pressure to reduce development time and maintain
tight cost control procedures.

The strategy of firms whol-

ly committed to the defense business generally has as
primary goal, long-run survival.
It is the task of procurement policy to harmonize cost
reduction and efficiency in the short-run and growth and
survival in the long-run.

It is a difficult challenge.

The industrial complex and profits.

Profits serve as

a measure of the effectiveness of company operations.

This

fact is no less true of those firms engaged in defense oriented activities.

The significance of defense industry

profits is well characterized by the extent of the controversy which exists within the political-military-business
community concerning the permissable degree of profitability to firms so engaged.
There are many points of debate and this section is
not designed to present anyone view.

Rather, some of the

more vexing problems will be pointed out, and some representative comments presented.
Profits can be measured basically in two ways:

as a

percentage of total sales, or as a return on capital investment.

A third method is also commonly used, that method

being return on stockholder's equity, a figure obtained by
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reducing the total capital investment by the cost of the
long term debt.

All of these are valid measures and could

be readily adapted to comparison if the accounting methods
used by the firms involved permitted such direct comparison.
Because of the possibility that a contractor can and might
report costs dishonestly in order to enhance and thus cloud
his actual situation, the Renegotiation Act of 1951 and the
Truth in Negotiations Act of 1962 were enacted.

This legis-

lation is designed to permit the government to properly
review contracts and recoup funds paid in excess of costs
plus a reasonable profit, and to provide government negotiators a tool with which they can require a contractor to
present confirming cost and pricing data.

The goal in every

case is to reduce costs and to ensure that pricing policies
used by contractors are honest and fair.
Table VI represents the after tax profit based upon
sales of several segments of industry for the years 1957
through 1964.

This data points up the fact that profits

of the defense industry appear to be consistently lower
than those of other industry.

This conclusion is born out

by a look at another set of data from a different source.
Figure 1 is a plot of profit as a percentage of sales
against the year of operations.

The upper curve is devel-

oped from a sampling of about 11,000 U. S. companies, the
data being processed by the Federal Trade Commission/

66

Securities Exchange Commission.

The lower curve is plot-

ted from data gathered by the Renegotiation Board as a
result of their activities,

This later data is not en-

tirely adequate as it does not separate those contracts
which pertain wholly to the Department of Defense from the
_ wide range of government contracts which were studied, and
there is no comparable data on return on capital investments.

It is presented as indicative, noting the somewhat

higher values as opposed to the data on the Aerospace Industry.

It can be generally said that the difference can

be explained by a purification of accounting methods.

After

the Renegotiation Board studies a particular procurement
action, they enter into new negotiations based upon the
actual costs they found in their study.

During the study,

some accounting methods and other charges are generally
rectified and the figures change slightly.
On the other hand, a review of the data considering
profit based upon total capital investment yields an interesting and perhaps more valid comparison.

The data from

the Federal Trade Commission/Securities Exchange Commission
on the 11,000 companies is replotted as percent profit based
upon the total capital investment.

The data on the defense

industry is the result of a study of high (over 200 million
dollars) and medium (between 25 and 200 million dollars)
volume defense contractors undertaken by the Logistics
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Management Institute.

This review is considered to be the

best and most authoritative study on defense profits that
has b een rnad e up

. 1 now. 28

unt~.

The Logistics Management Institute describes profits
as return on stockholder's equity, and return on capital
investment, as well as return on sales.
this data for comparison.

Figure 2 presents

Note that the split of commercial

business shows a more profitable trend in the late 1960's,
reflecting a finding of the study that additional diversion
was sought in the nondefense markets.

The poorer perform-

ance in the commercial market in the early 1960's is
primarily due to large losses of several of the major cornpanies.

The larger companies also exhibit a slightly more

successful performance than the medium volume suppliers.
This increase of performance is thought to be primarily due
to government actions in providing greater capital assistance
to the larger companies in the form of plant facilities,
equipment, and progress payments.
This review should show that the defense business does
not hold the profit potential that commercial enterprise
generally yields.

The strong accusations regarding massive

profits are usually the result of incomplete data or studies
having a bias which distorts the conclusions. 29
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Chief among

the questionable pictures is one presented by Dr. Murray

L. Weidenbaum,30 nmoJ an assistant Secretary of the Treasury, but a professor of economics of Washington University
at St. Louis at the time he completed his review.

The main

faults of the Weidenbaum study are thought to be the sample
size (only six defense and six nondefense firms were used),
and the fact that he did not attempt to separate the commercial business from the defense business of the defense
firms prior to drawing conclusions, and thirdly, there was
no attempt in his study to compare firms with generally
similar operations and product types.

The criteria he used

was similarity of sales volume as reported by the Fortune
Directory.

It is considered that such criteria would not

yield an entirely meaningful comparison and it will be
shown in later data to be presented, that the commercial
work of most defense firms is a more profitable undertaking
than the defense projects.
An attempt has been made to point up some of the objectionable features of the Weidenbaum report, yet some
notable people lend a great credence to this material.

The

report is used by the Joint Economic Committee as a general
baseline 3 l and Vice Admiral Rickover 3 2 utilizes the study
as a basis for some of his comments on the matter of defense
profitability.

6'9

More recently, the latest listing of the top 500
industrial concerns by Fortune presented the performance
of these companies for the 1970 calendar year. 33

As ex-

pected, because of the downturn of the economy and the
continued inflationary trend, 1970 was not a banner year
for either the commercial or the defense industry.

The

return on capital investment for all firms in the top
averaged 6.5 percent.
billion dollars.

sao

Sales dropped 12 percent to 21.7

A quick review of the performance of some

ten major defense suppliers suggests that in this sector of
the business world, even lower profits (offset by large
losses expected from some contractors) will be the ftnancial
story of 1970.

It should be noted that some of the larger

companies were involved in financial difficulty with government contracts; among these:

Lockheed Aircraft, Boeing,

General Dynamics, had not yet submitted data.
It might now be safely concluded that the defense industry does have lower profit potential than commercially
based enterprise.

One question that must be addressed is

that of the credibility of the data that comes from the industry, in short is the accounting correct and honest and
are there some discrepancies to be noted?
One of the vocal critics of high profits in the defense
industry is Vice Admiral Rickover.
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He has, in his

appearance before the various Congressional committees,
been a strong proponent for the uniform accounting standards
as a legislative tool to ensure that the government is receiving fair and just measure for the defense dollar.

In

1968, he appeared before the Joint Economic Committee on the
subject of high defense industry profits. 34
In testimony before the Committee, he compared the
profits reported by five representative contractors to the
profit figures determined by government auditors.

Table VII

gives the results of this comparison.
TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF REPORTED AND ACTUAL AUDITED
PROFITS OF FIVE DEFENSE FIRMS
CONTRACTOR

PROFITS REPORTED
AS PER CENT OF SALES

A

4.5

10.0

B

12.5

19.5

C

ILl

16.9

D

(2.0)a

15.0

E

21.6

32.7

PROFITS DETERMINED
BY GOV'T AUDIT, AS
PER CENT OF SALES

aReported by the company as a loss.
Source: U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings, 90th Congress,
2nd sess., 14 November 1968, pt. II, p. 12.
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The discrepancies between the reported profits and
the audited figures are obvious and provide a strong argument for a uniform accounting system in order to construct
a standard basis upon which to judge profits, either against
sales or total capital investment.

Not every firm is in the

business to try to prevaricate its profit position to the
government.

Host firms will staunchly defend the figures

which they present, however there is room for improvement
in the handling of many charges which should be broken into
finer detail to provide a more applicable distribution of
charges.
Table VIII shows how the profit targets that are
negotiated for the various contract types are being met.
The data base is from FY 1959 through the end of 1963.

The

aggregate worth of the contracts considered in the study
was eleven billion dollars.
This table spans a period of change in the procurement
policy when the incentive type contract was being emphasized.

The correspondence between the negotiated profit

and the actual profit earned is in quite close agreement
overall.

The higher allowed profits can be associated with

the higher risk contract forms.

It also is interesting to

note that the earned profit levels for the higher risk
contract types were also the highest, although these levels
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did not exceed the negotiated profit levels.

The cost plus

fixed fee appears to be the least desirable from the standpoint of profit, however the problems that such a contract
type can solve for a contractor are considerable in number
suCh that from his point of view, the profit may not be the
most important consideration.
TABLE VIII
COMPARISON OF NEGOTIATED AND ACTUAL PROFITS FOR SELECTED
CONTRACT TYPES: 1 JULY 1958 THRU 31 DECEMBER 1963.
AVERAGE
NEGOTIATED
PROFIT (PER CENT)

TYPE OF
CONTRACT
FIRM FIXED PRICE

AVERAGE
EARNED PROFIT
(PER CENT)

a

a

FIXED PRICE
REDETERMINABLE

9.3

8.6

FIXED PRICE
INCENTIVE

9.3

9.2

COST PLUS
INCENTIVE FEE

6.4

7.2

COST PLUS
FIXED FEE

6.4

6.1

a.

Data was not available.

Source. U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings, 90th Congress,
2nd sess., 14 November 1968, pt. II, p. 13.
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A further claim made by Vice Admiral Rickover was that
the negotiated profit ranges were increasing at a 'shocking'
rate.

His conclusions were basically drawn from the re-

sults of data tabulated in Table IX.

It should be noted

that these are negotiated targets which represent the latest emphasis in profit polity as enunciated by the Department of Defense.
TABLE IX
NEGOTIATED PROFIT RATES ON DOD CONTRACTS

TYPE OF CONTRACT

PROFIT BASED ON
PER CENT OF COST

PERCENTAGE
INCREASE

1959 - 1963

1966

FIRM FIXED PRICE

9.0

10.6

18

FIXED PRICE INCENTIVE

8.9

9.8

10

COST PLUS INCENTIVE FEE

6.0

8.2

37

COST PLUS FIXED FEE

6.2

7 J.,

23

AVERAGE INCREASE

7.7

9.7

26

Source: U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings, 90th Congress,
2nd sess., 14 November 1968, pt. II, p. 11.

The profit percentages tabulated utilize the 'weighted

...

guidelines'" method of computing the target profit the computation of which is based upon the estimated costs projected by the contractor. 3 5
This broadly based growth in the profit potential for
the defense industry expresses the goal of the management
policy of the Department of Defense under Secretary of
Defense McNamara.

When considered in the light of public

statements made by the Secretary, the policy is not surprising.

He said in part:
I want to emphasize that our objective here is not
to cut the profits of defense contractors. If anything,
they are too low. They average about three and onehalf percent of the selling price. This seems to me to
be on the margin of being an inadequate incentive for
defense work. 3 b
Mr. McNamara believed that the problems lie particu-

larly in the way things were bought, not so much in the
profit permitted when these same articles were procured.
For all this favorable action on his part to increase profits,

*The weighted guidelines method of computing profits
was introduced in 1964 as an attempt to move profit negotiations from a historical base to a rational series of
computations which would be designed to allow credit for
financial and technical risk within the type of contract
selected. In practice this means that because the risk is
greater with a fixed price type of contract, the profit
gUideline could be established at between five and seven
percent of the target cost. Additional factors which would
bear in the computation would be added to this figure to
yield the final profit figure. As a comparison, a cost plus
fixed fee contract might only be negotiated with a risk allowance of between zero and one percent of the target cost.
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the defense sector still refers to the McNamara period as
the "McNamara Depression," chiefly because of the way procurements were effected.

Large, multi-year procurements

meant fewer bidding opportunities and the opportunity at
the same time for the winning contractor to reduce his
cost.

He also pushed hard for the re-establishment of

price competition whereever possible as well as the wellpublicized shift to contract forms which passed a greater
risk to the contractor.

Even with the generally higher

profit levels, the management of the defense industry was
not overly joyous about these events. 3 7

Mr. McNamara re-

mains as an unpopular figure from both sides of the military-industrial complex.
As a summary view of the profit picture, Figure 3 presents the three accepted modes of profit measurement, per
cent of total capital invested, per cent of equity capital,
and per cent of sales* in such a manner to permit comparison
of the relative behavior of each of the measures.

Some of

the indications have already been pointed out in previous

*Of the three measures, per cent of equity capital
will yield the highest values for profit. This is due to
the removal of the corporate long term and short term debt
from the computation. Total invested capital includes the
debt as a factor and is generally the cause of any variance in the trend of the plots of the two measures. Profit
as a per cent of sales is self explanatory.
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discussion and are further confirmed by noting the trends
of this plot.

Defense contractors generally enjoyed high

profits in the decade of the fifties when other business
was lagging somewhat.

In 1961, the picture changed when

downward trending defense business profits, by any of the
measures, fell below the level of commercial business which
was moving upward.

There has been some stability and some

recovery in defense profits since 1964, perhaps attributable to the management policy of Secretary McNamara.

Even

with this slight upward trend, the commercial activity of
the defense industry has been several percentage points
higher than the defense work throughout the si.ties.

As a

forecast, the seventies will yield a similar picture.
The rather interesting comparison between the profit
picture for the medium sized contractor and the major contractor is made clear by reference to the total capital
invested curves.

The better indicated performance of the

large firm is due to the greater government share in the
investment for production facilities of a special nature.
Such things as plant equipment, tooling (jigs, dies, etc.),
land, and buildings all reduce the capital investment required of the large firm and increase the yield for him
against th•• ,criteria.

As another factor, the larger firm,
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with the larger dollar value and greater length of time
involved in the performance of a contract, will have larger
and more frequent progress payments which will reduce the
need for a firm to borrow working cash, also improving performance against the total capital investment category.
Later projects such as the F-IIl!TFX and the C-5A have
proven to place a severe cash flow strain on the contractor
even when government progress payments have been considered.
These projects have materially contributed to the downturn
in the defense business profit picture.
The data presented through Figure 3 is that Which resulted from the study by the Logistics Management Institute,
mentioned previously in this discussion.
Summary.

This sweeping background of the military-in-

dustrial complex should be sufficient to lead to several
conclusions regarding the defense industry.
Since the political judgements of the Korean War, the
United States has chosen to operate two economies, one for
the commercial base and the other dual economy for defense.
This decision has generally met with success, although not
all segments of the economy escaped without some harm. 38
The military-industrial complex can therefore mark its
birthday and of course, it has the 'cold war' as its continuance. 39 The spending of large sums for defense was a
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natural adjunct to the foreign policy of the United States
and a supportive defense industry in the 'dual' economy
was sustained.
Technological change was another factor which necessitated the military-industrial complex.

It was highly

important that the western world remain a leader in the
sciences.

Only the government through the management of

the Department of Defense could accomplish this end.
President Eisenhower's famous speech can now be quoted to express his thoughts beyond the point at which
critics cease to use his word.

He continued:

A vital element in keeping the peace is our
military establishment. Our arms must be mighty,
ready for instant action so that no potential a!§ressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.
So in truth, President Eisenhower was not saying that
the United States should not have a strong defense industry in conjunction with a strong military organization.
He may not have desired such an arrangement, but he realistically counseled for the present age:
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the
United States had no armament industry. American
makers of plowshares could, with time and as required,
make swords as well.
But we can no longer risk emergency improvization of national defense. We have been compelled to
create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. 4 l
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We now have such an industry, and we have a militaryindustrial complex.

The trial will be to manage its awe-

some capability wisely and well to meet the threat that
our political leaders see to the national interests of the
United States.

That such a capability is vital to our

well being as a nation goes without saying.

Bo

CHAPTER V
TRENDS IN INCENTIVE CONTRACTING
Introduction.

The incentive contract type became a

particularly important procurement strategy for the Department of Defense during the McNamara years, due largely to
the emphasis he placed upon the use of this form.

The goal

was, of course, to correct deficiencies that were becoming
more obvious with the cost reimbursement type of contract
and to encourage a reduction in costs to the government.
The concept of the incentive contract is not new~~: but the
management strategy to replace the Cost Plus Fixed Fee
contract with an incentive type is a key management policy
decision from the McNamara era.
Incentive provisions were to be carefully employed to
maximize the effect of the profit motive which characterizes the successful commercial ventures of industry.

The

rewards for this effort would be scaled to be maximum to

J.

"The incentive contract was developed in part because
of the opinion of many government procurement officials who
believed the cost reimbursement contract contributed to the
inefficiency of contractors. The cost reimbursement contracts were felt to be instrumental in causing large cost
over-runs and unnecessary ~~anges to the basic contract.
The intent of the basic contract incentive device is to induce the contractor to improve program management by sharing
with him a portion of the cost savings which result from his
more careful management.
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the efficient producer, moderate to the mediocre producer,
and poor or even negative to the poor manager.

With a

direct tie established between contractor performance and
his profit level, the maximum amount of self motivation
should be the result.

Since about 1962, the Department of

Defense procurement agencies have made steady progress to
substitute the general profit incentive approach for the
fixed fee approach.

To be successful however, the govern-

ment must permit the greatest latitude in management actions
to the contractor and should participate in only the most
essential management functions.

Also implicit in this is

that the technical requirements of the procurement have
been properly, completely, and carefully
Review of Contracts Types Employed.

m~naged.

The yearly per-

centage of cost plus fixed fee and incentive contracts can
be compared through study of Figure 5.

It is clear that

the effort to increase use of the incentive contract has had
extensive results and the trend is very clearly marked from
Fiscal Year 1961 onward.
The quantitative success of the policy appears to be
fact, however one might justifiably inquire concerning the
quality of the new contracting.

There has been an effort

to improve qualitatively through improvement of contract
terms to discriminate in terms of final profit between good
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performance and bad, and between effective control of
cost or waste.

Table X presents the changing patterns

of use for the various contract types during the period
1955 through 1965.
Furthermore, the Defense Department estimates that
"ten cents is saved for each dollar shifted from CPFF
(cost plus fixed fee) to other terms of contracts."l To
achieve this saving in contract costs, some $5.5 billion
dollars worth of procurements each year have been shifted
from cost-plus-fixed-fee to firm-fixed-price and fixedprice-incentive contract forms.

The estimated cost savings

in the period FY 1963 through FY 1965 are as follows:
TABLE XI
ESTIMATED COST SAVINGS THROUGH CONTRACT CONVERSION,
CPFF TO INCENTIVE FEE

Fiscal Year

Estimated value of
contracts converted
from CPFFa

Estimated cost
savings per
year

1963

$4.3 billion

$436 million

1964

$6.2 b i Ilion

$616 million

1965

$6.6 billion

$658 million

a CPFF (cost-plus-fixed-fee) contract form.
Source: Department of Defense, The Secretary of Defense, Hemorandum for the President, Defense Department Cost
Reduction Program (i-lashington: 12 July 1965), P 11.
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The Cost-plus-fixed-fee contract form, its rise and
fall.

The cost-plus-fixed-fee contract was a useful and

almost mandatory tool for the procurement of weapons systems during and following World War II.

The rapidity of

the mobilization effort, the relative inexperience of many
firms in developing new weapons, and the lack of any centralized procurement agency were all reasons which reinforced the use of this contract form.

Subsequent to the

war, the character of defense procurement changed from
predominantly production contracts to contracts for research,
development and production of experimental models and missiles.

This trend resulted in an even greater expansion in

CPFF contracting.

Considering the risk involved and the

cost uncertainties in this type of procurement, the CPFF
contract was a highly suitable choice.
Table XII serves to amplify the situation for the time
period in which the change took place.

Moreover the cost

plus fixed fee contracts became standard for use in the procurement of research, development, and production of experimental systems based upon the research conducted.
The period from 1955 through 1962 might be described as
the age of sophistication in weapons systems, the heavy emphas is at that time was on research and deve lopment and
because the cost plus fixed fee contract form was the standard for this type of work, its use accelerated.

In 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara declared his
policy to reduce the use of the cost plus fixed fee contract,

He said in part;

Both Department and industry officials agree that
cost plus fixed fee contracts not only fail to provide
incentives for economy, but actually deaden management efficiency by removing the need for either the
Department or the contractor to estimate costs acZurately, and to plan and control programs tightly,
The Secretary described the management atmosphere resuIting from the cost plus fixed fee contract very succinctly,

The cost plus fixed fee contract form commits the

government to pay all costs plus a guaranteed profit and
the contractor is neither rewarded for good management or
penalized for poor management.

Another more insidious prob-

lem exists with the Cost plus fixed fee contract.

It is

tempting to the contractor to maximize the projected costs
during the negotiation.

With the fee set in the contract,

the contractor sees no benefit for himself in strongly instituting cost control measures.

In fact, should he choose

to do this, he more often than not will prove his estimates
to be incorrect.

As a second factor, but no less important,

he recognizes that the actual costs incurred against the
lead contract would be used in the negotiation of a follow
contract which might be on a fixed price basis.

The higher

the actual cost experience on the cost plus fixed fee contract, the higher the fixed price which will be allowed on
the follow-on procurement.

Efficient operation by the con-

tractor against the requirements of the second contract is
assured and will yield good management a high return.
The cost plus fixed fee contract does, however, still
retain a useful role as an emergency device.

A manager may,

when he does not have the opportunity to accomplish the
requisite planning, utilize the cost plus fixed fee form
as a mechanism to begin effort on a large development program when circumstances demand.
A study made by a graduate student at the University of
Nebraska compares 47 representative cost plus fixed fee
contracts with the results from 60 incentive type contracts':"'.
He reports that findings indicated an under-run of 1.08 per
cent on the 60 incentive contracts based upon a total negotiated cost of 2.1 billion dollars. 3

A negotiated target

profit of 8.1 per cent was increased to 8.3 per cent through
the incentive provisions.

The increase in contractor profits

*Fifty-one contracts were of the fixed price incentive
type and nine were of the cost plus incentive fee type.
Sharing arrangements ranged from 95/5 to 50/50. The composite sharing arrangement averaged to be 80/20. Target
profits ranged from 3.9% to 12%, with a composite target
profit of 8.1%.
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was 4.3 million dollars and the reduced costs to the government totaled 22 million dollars.

When the additional 4.3

million is deducted from the government's savings, the net
cost reduction is 17.7 million dollars. 4
The 47 cost plus fixed fee contracts had an initial
estimated cost of 328 million dollars.
run of 1.8 per cent was the experience.

An overall net overIndividually, the

performance of the cost plus fixed fee contracts was rather
poor.

Nearly half experienced over-runs ranging between 30

and 104.4% of the estimated cost.

This compares to the high-

est incentive contract over-run of about 25 per cent of estimated cost. 5
Table XIII presents a synopsis of the situation described in the previous paragraphs.

Additional studies made

for comparison by researchers have yielded generally similar
results.

In a survey of 139 fixed price incentive contracts

completed by the Navy during the eight year period from 1954
to 1962, the researcher determined a net under-run of 1.7 per
cent. 6

Figure 6 is a plot of the distribution of the outcome

of these contracts.

Some 83% of the contracts experienced

final return costs within the range of plus or minus ten per
cent of the target cost.
is tabulated in Table XIV.

~he

overall result of the study

The contracts were divided into
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year blocks of three, two and a single year for consideration of negotiated and actual cost and profits.

The curious

feature of this data is that generally better performance
was achieved in the first time period considered, gradually
deteriorating until a net over-run was experienced in the
1960-1961 time period.
1962.

Performance then improved again in

This behavior is not explained, however it would

seem that sample size and dollar value of the individual contract would cause a bias to the data.

The contracts studied

in 1960-1961 were of a higher average value and the twothirds over-run bias of the data represents a considerable
impact.

Further, examining the three year period from 1960-

1962 results in a comparable sample size and reduces the
over-run to about 3 per cent.

The performance then nearly

approximates a straight line relationship with a deteriorating slope over the three sample periods.
The positive effect of the incentive type contract has,
nevertheless, been generally satisfactory in achieving some
additional measure of cost control, and meeting the needs of
both the contractor and the government through the flexibility and variation of type available.

The services can

properly emphasize any factor of significance through appropriate use of the weighted guidelines and achieve a
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profit posture which comes close to optimizing the direction of the contractor's efforts. 7

This ideal rela-

tionship does not accrue automatically with the incentive
contract however, and must be carefully and intelligently
designed into the contract.
Continued Need for the Cost Plus Fixed Fee Contract.
The incentive contract alone is not the complete answer
to the structuring of the government-industry interface.
Certainly the continued use of the cost plus fixed fee contract will characterize research and development and firm
fixed price contracts will be utilized in those situations
when competition can be achieved, either through secondsourcing* or advertised procurements.

This kind of versa-

tility will be absolutely necessary to be certain that the
government received the full benefit of the free enterprise
system.

J.

ftSecond-sourcing is that procurement strategy followed
when competition is introduced at the completion of the research, development and prototype testing phase. This is
done by making all the data developed by the lead contractor available to all interested and responsive bidders and
selecting the winner on the basis of a firm fixed price
contract. This strategy may also be followed when a higher rate of production is required.
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It is also axiomatic that the incentives that constitute the incentive contract structure such as the
,fC
profit-sharing rate,
the matching of the risk with the
sharing rate and the influence of the combination of these
factors on the contractor must be selected with the utmost
of care.

It is not always obvious which treatment of the

sharing proportion will yield the better result.
study points out that:

A Rand

"At present, there exists no use-

ful empirical information relating cost performance to the
sharing proportion." 8

It therefore does not follow that

the lower proportion for the contractor will yield lower
costs for the government if the contract is completed under the negotiated cost.

The value of the high contractor

share percentage must be considered in the light of the
degree of motivation achieved.

..."The

It is likewise necessary to

profit sharing rate is represented by the percentage of the net difference between the negotiated target
cost for a contract and the actual costs charged to the contract. Thus a sharing rate of 80/20 would mean that the
government would receive 80% of the net difference, and the
contractor 20% of the net difference of any under-run.
In
the case of an over-run, the government would suffer additional costs of 80% of the over-run, the contractor's sharpbeing 20%. It can be seen that a contractor would take
careful cognizance of the risk involved before agreeing to
operate with a sharing rate much greater than 80/20.
In
itself, the incentive contract is a strong motivating factor to completely and properly assess the risk.
Currently, the sharing rate is about 80/20 for most
incentive type contracts.

couple this influence with the drive the contractor sees to
minimize the cost of the weapon system.

By combining the

sharing rate with well chosen performance incentives, the
lower bound of cost can be controlled to a certain extent.
The goal of this strategy is to prevent the contractor from
compromising the quality of the weapon system in order to
overachieve against an attractive contractor bias of the
sharing rate. Further, successive incentives might be
considered as a means of controlling myopia which a contractor might exhibit if a short term gain situation might
be induced during the development stage.
some of the considerations.

These are just

There are others which fall

beyond the scope of this discussion,9 but it is sufficient
to say that the use of the incentive contract as a tool is
an extremely complex proposition which must take into consid.eration many factors, time phased over the performance
life of the contract.

Careful consideration of all factors

however, will allow the contractor and the government to
develop a document which can achieve the best working relationship for both parties.
Incentive Contracting:

Some Criticisms.

Criticism of

the incentive contracting method has not been absent.
cause targets are based upon target costs, critics have

9~

Be-

pointed out that a contractor can inflate his costs and
thereby induce the system to yield a greater profit to
him.

Critics feel that cost savings will not be realized,

rather the contractor will perform against an unrealistic,
overpriced target cost which will work to the contractor's
net advantage. l O
An additional criticism of the incentive contract is
that some believe that the real and only incentive is to
cause the contractor to play a bargaining game with the
government.

He is in fact rewarded by his ability to

"sell an inflated cost estimate during contract negotiations,,,ll and not his efficiency in controlling costs.
Cost estimation is therefore an extremely important
element in the development of a contractual relationship
involving incentives.

To this end. the Truth in Negotia-

tions Act and the present drive to achieve uniform cost accounting standards will materially assist in overcoming
some of this diaadvantage.

Both government and industry

have studied this problem and to some extent, reached
differing conclusions. 12 The industrial interests indicate that they have collective concern for the manner of
implementation and interpretation of the Act at the various levels of governments
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Major criticisms of regulatory implementations
of PL 87-653 have been directed at • • • optional
application of data submission and certification requirements to contracts under $100,000, failure to
prOVide adequately for recognition of the exemptions
stated in the Law, and audit provisions covering
after-the-fact performance cost reviews under fixed
price contracts.
From a practical standpoint, the cost of compliance with existing implementing requirements,
both in terms of absolute dollars and loss of productive labor time is enormous. Furthermore, Industry believes thatlShis eost greatly exceeds the
benefits derived.
In turn, from ORe of the most vocal members of the Navy's
Material Command, Viee Admiral Rickover.
First, the Truth in Negotiations Act assumed
that costs and profits can be measured. Without
uniform. standards of accounting, this is not possible. • • •
Second, contracting officers may bypass the
Truth in Negotiations Act by determing that competition is adequate, even in negotiated procurements.
• • •
Third, requirements for cost data utl~er the
Truth in Negotiations Act can be waived. I,
Later in hie testimony, Vice Admiral Rickover called for
stronger provisions of the Act and a limitation of waivers
such that no contractor doing more than one million dollars
in total business per year would be eligible for a waiver. l S
These criticisms point out just how wide apart the
managers of industry and in the Department of Defense are
on this matter and also underscores how important cost
estimation of high acouracy is to the contracting process,
particularly incentive contracts.
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It must also be conceded that the advantage lies
with the contractor in the bargaining process.

The

superior knowledge which a contractor bas at his disposal regarding costs, and the lack of competition for
the advanced weapons systems places the government at
an effective disadvantage.
It is of course not sufficient to obtain good eost
data but the weapons system must be fully defined.

Only

by precisely defining the proposed weapon system can the
defense department achieve reliable eost estimates.

The

incentive provisiona will DDt be effective otherwise.
Management Changes to Encourye the Proper Use gf
Incentive TyPe Contracts.

The incorporation of a major

change to the Armed Services Procurement Regulations designed to encourage the use of the incentive contract
form is a significant management action. *

This change is

directed toward replacing the cost reimbursement type of
contract with the incentive type in those situations when
it' is not possible to achieve competition through a

*Change number 8 dated 15 April 1962 rearranged the
preferred order of contracts in the sequence of decreasing cost responsibility to the contractor, from the firm
fixed price contract to the cost plus fixed fee contract.
The alignment then is from the type offering maximum incentive to the type offering the least incentive.

formally advertised procurement.

It is also considered

appropriate under the authority of this change, to utilize
the incentive contract form for development of weapon systems, an area where the cost reimbursement contract only
would be acceptable.
Performance incentive provisions have also been recommended for the procurement of major systems where administratively practical.

In addition, the ASPR recommends that

all of the performance factors (cost, system performance,
and delivery parameters), be a consideration in a competitive process to select the prime contractor.

Thus con-

tractors competinB for the contract would propose targets
in cost, performance and delivery.

The choice of the con-

tractor would then be based upon the best of these proposals.

This procedure does have merit in that following an

incentive contract based upon the contractor's own proposal,
there is a strong tendency to encourage the contractor to
make a moee realistic proposal than if the contract were to
be a negotiated cost plus fixed fee type.
Further incentives are designed to increase contractor
acceptance of higher risk with the promise for higher profits
as the reward.

A reasonably firm and precise definition

of the sesired product is a requirement if the contractor
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expects to have a good prospect for higher profit and a
high performance evaluation.

Placing appropriate emphasis

on these factors should serve to deter the contractor from
focusing on ways to beat the contract terms to ways and
means to promote his own productive efficiency.

Moreover

if the profit levels were sufficiently attractive and free
from public declaimer and if future source selection might
be more closely related to past contractor performance,
management of defense industry might well be motivated to
induce the Department of Defense negotiators into incentive
contracts rather than the cost reimbursement types.
It may be that precise contract definition, strong
incentive contract with prospective high profits, and performance tied to future source selectlon could assure well
directed efforts from the defense industry.
The Packard Memorandum of 28 May 1970.

Although change

number eight to the ASPR has strongly endorsed the firm
fixed price contract as having essentially an 1/100 profit
sharing ratio, the memorandum issue by Deputy Secretary
of Defense David Packard on 28 May 1970 effected some changes
to this emphasis. l 6 Mr. Packard established policy guidance which gave preference to the cost plus incentive contract as being the first choice for advanced development
and full scale development for major systems.
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When risk oan be appropriately managed, a competitive fixed price contract can be let for well defined
components and subsystems whioh in effect partition a
program such that competition can be achieved to the
maximum extent administratively possible.

In oases

where risk is being reduoed through research and development, fixed price contracting can then be illJBediately
sought.

Flexibility in making the contract type deci-

sion will be retained with the contracting officer. but
in the case of major weapons systems procurement. the
final approval of the contracting officers decision rests
with the Defense Selected Acquisition Review Council
(DSARC). *

Hr. Packard's policy statellent encourages the use
of negotiated fixed price contracts when effective competition is not available.

This negotiation is to be

undertaken when development parameters are sufficiently

*The Defense Selected Acquisition Review Council is
a Secretarial level review panel in the Department of
Defense set up to make formal review of the progress of
an acquisition program at specific milestones or at the
termination of the °major program phases. (Research,
development, protGtype production. production are phases.)
All major decision points in a program are therefore reviewed by this Council after previous review by all intervening levels of manasement. The Council Staff is kept
continually aware of programs of the selected acquisition
programs through periodic reports. Special reperts are
also made by project managers when unusual cost changes
or risk situations becoae apparent in the performance of
a program.
-97

secure to permit a production decision to be made.

The

policy to leek advertiled competitive procurement for
well defined sublysteml shall be exercised within the
negotiated fixed price contract as well.
Letter contracts under this policy statement are to
be miniaized and change orders* are not to be issued until
they have been contractually priced or until a ceiling price
has been agreed upon.

A restriction on letter contracts

does result in a more difficult situation for the procurement of naval ships. as many of these acquisitions are
initiated by letter contracts.

It is often true that con-

version of these contracts to other forms within the 180
day time limitation does not occur in actuality making it
difficult to operate under this policy.

S,..ary.

This chapter haa presented material designed

to point out how the choice of contract foI'll can affect the
cost of goode and services to the government.

The review

susgested some of the faults of the cost plus fixed fee
fora and traced the development of the cost plus incentive
*Change orders are those directed modifications to the
basic design of a weapon system Which generally involves
major redesign and production work on the part of the contractor in order to incorporate the change. Change orders
may be cl..sed into two categories, lIandatory and desirable.
If mandatory, the modification is generally accomplished
before the system is delivered. If desirable, the chall8e
Jlay be docwnented and accomplished at a later time during
an overhaul or lIodernization period. Change orders are a
serious contribucor to cost growth and contractor claims
against a project.

fee contracts.

The incentive contract was discussed in

the light of the many bases on which the incentive contract can be structured.

The inherent flexibility of

design and the variation possible allow the contracting
officer the greatest latitude in finding a common ground
of beneficial terms to both the government and the contractor.
Problem areas do exist in cost estimation and cost
control which affect the profit levels of the contractor
and permit him an opportunity to falsify his cost.

This

problem however exists with all contract forms and is not
restricted to the incentive type.
the incentive type.

It is accentuated With

Some discussion was included to por-

tray the industry point of view and contrast the diametrically opposed government point of view on this question.
There are many less extreme positions in between, and the
uniform cost accounting standards idea is rapidly gaining
support such that some form of this requirement will no
doubt be soon required by law.
As with all contract types, the incentive contract
works best when there are precisely defined specifications.
however. When properly drawn with a balance of risk assigned,
the contractor can be motivated to attack the problem of
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improved system performance rather than profit maximization through reduction in cost alone.

This is an

extremely important feature of the incentive contract
and the performance incentives should be carefully optimized to provide the promise of high profits.
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CHAPTER VI
THE IMPACT OF THE CONTRACT FORM ON THE ATTITUDES
OF THE PRIVATE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
Introduction.

The public and private shipyards are

among the important defense industries that are located in
the coastal regions of the United States.

Representative

Charles Bennett of Florida, in addressing the Seapower
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee gauged
the importance of the industry by fitting the aggregate tocals of the various naval and private shipyards against
the giant corporations listed in the Fortune Directory of
the 500 largest industrial enterprises.

He said.

" • • •

the naval shipyards alone rank about 38th and the shipyards,
together with the purchase of new ships and conversions
from private yards, rank the Naval Ship Systems Command
operations at about enterprise No. 13." 1

This is an im·

portant comparison to keep in mind as one considers the
management of the various and diverse elements which go
together to make this large and many times unwieldy defense organization.
Few industries have compiled the long and enviable
records in the days of World War II when the shipbuilding capability of the United States was called upon
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to be the shipbuilder for the Allied Powers.

It could

also be said, partly with tongue in cheek, that few industr,ies appear today in such unchanged form from those
tradition-filled days of World War II than the shipyards
of this nation.

For some, the glamour is wearing thin

and for some, the pot appears to be drying up.

This chap-

ter will attempt to explore some of these events and suggest some reasons and rationale for the relationships
which now exist in the shipbuilding sector of the mi1itaryindustrial complex.

At the outset, it must be acknowledged

that this discussion is in no way a complete and all inclusive treatment of the very complex nature of the contracting interface between the Department of Defense (Navy)

and the private shipbuilders.

Some highlights and trends

will be noted as the most significant factors and more
complete treatment will be left to the expert in the field.
Beyond acknowledging the important and vital task performed by the ten public Naval Shipyard no further mention
will be made of their activity.

The need for an indtse-

nous ship repair capability as an integral part of the
Naval service will be accepted as fact and the controversy
ooncerning the construction and repair economies in the
public and private yards will not be joined.
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There is an

influence exerted on the private sector by the Naval shipyards in that the division of the repair work available
from the Navy 1s a constant source of concern to private
yard management and brings much political pressure to bear
on the Navy.

This division has been relatively constant

for some years at approximately 65% awarded to the Naval
shipyards and 35% to the private 8hipyards. 2 Trends in
current time have been to reduce the private yard share
due to the smaller quantity of work available and the growing complexity of that repair work. It is predicted that
.
this controversy will continue status quo for some time
hence.

A SPrvey of the Private Yards.

There are sixteen

major shipyard organizations in the United States which are
capable of constructing ships larger than some 600 feet in
length and some 80 feet in beam.

Seven of these yards are

on the East Coast, five on the Gulf Coast, and four to the
West. J

There are no yards on the Great Lakes that are

counted in this group although several do exist and have
been importUlt in the Navy's new construction programs for
destroyer types and smaller craft.

Table XV lists the

yards and provides 80me statistical data of importance.
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There are a total of 270 private shipyards engaged in
shipbuilding and repair work in the continental United States,
Hawaii and Puerto Rico.

Many of the yards, as implied, are

quite small with maximum employment levels of under 100 men.
This results in a concentration aueh that one-third of the
shipyards employ almost 90 per cent of the labor force working in the shipbuilding industry.4
Figure 7 shows the employment levels for the shipbuilding industry inclusive of Navy and commercial yards,
along with the total employment for both categories.

From

the results of various MARAD studies, it can be generally
stated that the larger commercial yards are at employment
levels about 60% of that which would provide a maximum efficient peacetime employment level as matched to capabilities
of the physical plant possessed by these shipyards. S Certainly, many of the 8maller yards are at much lower employment levels than 60% and at this time considering the present
slump in the commercial shipping, yards without major Navy
oontracts are operating below SO% of capacity.
Table XVI presents an interesting breakdown of area
interest in shipbuilding by employment in ooastal regional
This table lists only employment in the private shipyards,
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TABLE XVI
TOTAL PRIVATE SHIPYARD EMPLOYMENT BY COASTAL
ZONE REGION (FEBRUARY 1970)
NORTHEAST

MIDDlE ATLANTIC
GULF
SOUTHWEST
NORTHWEST
GREAT LAKES

•
•
•
•
•
•

• • • • • • • • • •

30,000

• • • • • • • • • •

40,000

• • • • • • • • • •

37,000

• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •

15,000
9,000
9,000
140,000

TOTAL

Sources U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed
Services, Ss;atus of r1Ryarg,. Heari~. 91st Congress,
2nd sess., 15 June 1 70, pt. I, p.~O 2
It can be correctly inferred that the greatest installed capacity for shipbuilding is installed on the East
Coast with the Gulf Coast a very close second.

There exists

only several more positions (shipways or buildiIl8 basins) in
the East Coast yards as compared to the Gulf. 6

It can be

argued that the Gulf may be ahead in actual productive capacity with the capabilities that are a part of the new
Litton Ship SysteNs Division yard.

It will be several years

for this claim to come true as that yard will be primarily
dedicated to more complex naval construction programs and
it is not yet free of development bugs, nor fully staffed.
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The new Litton yard represents a facility of the most
modern design and concept.

The total employment capabili-

ty of the 'twinned' Litton yards at Pascagoula, Mississippi,
i.e. Ingalls Nuclear Shipbuilding Division and the new yard
is estimated to reach 16,000 in the later months of 1973. 7
The division will be approximately 5000 employees at the
older facility on the east bank and 11,000 at the new yard
on the west bank.

These figures will increase Gulf Coast

employment in shipbuilding to about 48,000 by 1973 assuming
that there will be no major reductions at any of the remaining Gulf Coast yards.

With slightly lower wage rates than

the remainder of the U. S. shipbuilding industry and with
self-sustaining capabilities,* the long term growth of shipbuilding along the Gulf Coast is well assured.
In the East, the large shipyard of the Newport News
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company in Newport News, Virginia
operates with sustained employment of about 22,000,** about
70% of facility capacity.8

The mix between defense

*Self-sustaining capability is considered to mean that
the shipyard is capable Within its own plant to manufacture
all the necessary components to build a ship. The only yard
With true self-sustaining capabilities is the Avondale Yard
at Westwego, La. The other yards must depend upon other
firms as suppliers for major subsystems such as shafting
and prope110rs, turbines, gears, etc. It is very seldom
that a shipyard operates in a self-sustaining mode and it
refers largely only to capability.
**In terms of employment, the Newport News Shipbuilding
and Dry Dock Company is the largest shipyard in the United
States.
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and commeroia1 business is currently about 80/20 favoring the defense work. 9

This yard is significant in that

it has specialized in the nuclear powered aircraft carrier
such that it is the sole supplier to the Navy of these important vessels.

M a nuclear qualified shipyard, Newport

News has the capability to construct all sizes of nuclear
powered surface vessels and submarines.

There are two other

shipyards with this capability, General Dynamics Corporation
with surface capability at Quincy, Massachusetts and submarine capability at Groton, and Litton Industries with
submarine capability at the Ingalls Nuclear Division at
Paac88oula, Mississippi.

Thus three East Coast yards and

one Gulf Coast yard have nuclear qualifications which could
extend to commercial vessels.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation operates eight facilities
(five on the East Coast, one on the Gulf Coast, and two on
the West Coast), the only one of which dedicated to shipbuilding is the Sparrow's Point, Maryland yard.

There is

a new building basin at this yard, the largest in the
United States, measuring 1200 feet by 200 feet by 27 feet
deep for the construction of large tankers and bulk carriers. 10

Bethlehem's management i8 phaling out (!)f defense

work, having in 1963 divested themselves of the Quincy,
Massachusetts yard (now owned and operated by General Dynamics) and having recently completed work on two 8II1Ilunition
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replenishment ships.

the remainder of the activity in

shipbuilding by Bethlehem is concentrated in tankers and
bulkers along with barges and of course, repair of commercial vessels.
the Maryland Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company is
engaged entirely in commercial ventures, primarily repair
and conversions of merchant vessels.

Some Navy work in-

volving overhauls of minecraft and auxiliary vessels has
been placed with this yard, but recently there has been
little work of significance.
Sun Shipbuildill8 does not currently have any Navy new
construction work and is not actively seeking any but logistic ships, of the type used in Military Sea Transportation Service charter service.

Sun has an innovative manage-

ment group and has embarked upon some uniquely suceessfu1
programs involving the construction and operation of unusual ship types such as the William Callaghan, tbe gas turbine
powered roll-on roll-off Ship char'tered to HStS.
General Dynamics Corporation operates two yards in the
Northeast Region, one at Groton, Connecticut devoted exclusively to the construction and conversion of nuclear powered submarines, and one at Quincy, Massachusetts for surface work.

~

• General Dynamics is an active seeker of

1·08

Navy work and haa adequate backlog at Groton.

The surface

operation at Quincy is less active and the Navy programs
there are drawing to a close with nothing as yet on the
order book from the defense sector.

Quincy is looking to

cOlDJDercial work to fill the gap in activity at this time.
In the far Northeast, Bath Iron Works represents a
long association with the Navy in the construction of
strayer and destroyer leader type ships.

de~

These ships have

a reputation for quality and Bath is a strong contender for
ships in this category.

Currently, Bath, having lost the

bid to achieve the 30 ship DD-963 destroyer contract, is
looking toward commercial work to maintain operations When
the destroyer leader modernization program completes later
in 1972.

Bath will be a strong competitor for later Navy

contracts involving small combatants.
In the W.at, matters are particularly bleak.

Todd

Shipyards and Lockheed Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Corporation
have all but completed the Navy work in their West Coast
facilities and National Steel will soon

comple~e

the

struction of a multi-year run of tank landing ships.

con~

Both

Navy and commercial work on the Pacific Coast does not hold
promise for immediate relief and all yards are in need of
new business.
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The concentration of work is centered in the Gulf
Coastal region with Avondale Shipyards and the two Litton
Yards holding the greatest share.

Avondale is completing

a multi-year contract for destroyer escort vessels with nine
more to be delivered.

In addition, there are several com-

mercial projects for Lash ships which will provide work for
several years more.

With the exception of the Ingalls

Nuclear Division, Litton has sufficient work to last well
beyond the mid 70's with the landing assault ship and the
DD-963 destroyer acquisition.
Almost all of the shipyards mentioned do need aDd are
depending strongly on the MARAD program. to provide them work
during the 1970's.

The Navy, even thOUgh additional monies

are being devoted to shipbuilding, is facing the problem of
fewer numbers of more complex ships.

This of course trans-

lates into higher expenditures but fewer yards and fewer
ships with a high percentage of the procurement dollar going
into subsystems.

Certainly one positive effect to the MARAD

program will be to insure a level employment for the period
and hopefully, there will be some stimulation for capital
improvement.
Shipyard Modernization and Capital Investment.

In the

American shipbuilding industry, major capital investment to
promote modernization of facilities and techniques has become

HO

a problem for government out of concern for the industrial
mobilization base, the condition of the U. S. flag merchant
fleet, and the cost of shipbuilding, both commercial and
naval.

In the words of a manager of one of the major ship-

yards,

"Our plans for future investment in the shipyard

are viable and will be commensurate with the business opportunities available."ll

This statement is suggestive of the

industry wide attitude with regard to modernization and it
is of course quite rational and businesslike.

Only if the

economic activity will permit a reasonable return to be expected fram the capital investment, will that improvement
be made.

It has been implied that many yards require rel-

atively large transfusions of capital to renew equipment
and improve upon the production process.

General Dynamics

made capital investments of $23 million in the Quincy facility to achieve a more modern plant before commencing
operations in 1964. 12 Improvements such as these do indeed help to reduce cost by promoting efficiencies however
due mainly to process bottlenecks which are often extremely expensive to remove, full efficiency is seldom achieved.
Figure 8 outlines the overall capital expenditure in
the sbipbuilding industry.

A positive trend in the period

1966 to 1969 is largely attributable to the $130 million
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expended by Litton on the new Pascagoula Yard.

Newport

News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock has expended soae $69 million per year since 1958.

Bethlehem Steel has an expan-

sion and improvement program underway which when complete
will invest $50 million,

Todd Shipyards have invested some

$4 million per year for the past ten years.

These are sig-

nificant figures and they are also the most active yards
among the U, S, shipyards as seen from the order book,

All

other yards are not without plant improvement plans, but
they are without the motivating capital to undertake these
plans.
Unfortunately, in some cases the small periodic expenditure can accomplish little more than staving off near obsolescence rather than making the sweeping renovation
necessary for sizable progress.
The modernization program envisioned by Bath Iron Works
in conjunction with their competition for the DD-963 destroyer program was to cost approximately $64 million. l 3
It was planned to build new production facilities for the
construction of the 30 destroyers,
undertaken

8S

This program was not

the contract was lost, but it points out the

importance of the backlog of work to the shipyard Ilanager
as it influences his decision to expend oapital for modernization,

A similar though not as extensive plan is en-

visioned for Bath baaed upon the number of MARAD ships
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that are bUilt there,14

This program is very important

because of the relatively low risk involved in the construction of these Ships,
It is reasonably clear that in the recent past, and
certainly for the present and foreseeable future, the
private shipbuilding sector will be unable to modernize or
construct new yards to replace the old plants unless major
government participation provides the necessary market
conditions,
Government action must be scaled such that sufficient
market opportunity is developed in order to motivate shipyards to make the needed significant improvements,

A con-

tract clause stating a requirement to present physical and
financial plans for improvements design to reduce the end
cost of the product may be implemented,

This strategy is

integral with the Maritime Administration's program and
in the Navy's total package procurement acquisitions for
the landing assault ships (LHA) and the DD-963 destroyers.
This incentive is also available through multi-year contracts for large production runs of standard ships,

Fur-

ther, when the contract definition process can be followed,
there is an opportunity for the contractor to adapt
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the design to his production facilities and apply the
most effective modernization to his production processes.
In summary, Mr. Ed Hood of the Shipbuilders Council
of America, in a statement before the Seapower Subcommittee reflected on the situationa
If. on the one hand. the industry has opportunities to build only one or a few ships at a time with
little prospect of future orders. shipyards must. perforce. undertake to build a limited number of ships
within the immediate framework of existing facilities.
In this case. there is no prospect of amortizing
new capital investment beyond the i1DRlediate. and short
term. workload. this inhibition has been a charaoteristio of most merchant shipbuilding contracts during
the past two decades.
On the other hand. the volume/rate of delivery
demands of a particular contract may dictate major
expansion of existing facilities. these kinds of
contracts stimulate considerable innovative improvements in techniques as well as facilities. and also
enable volume production at optimum costs.
the Navy's 17-ship LSt contract of 1966. 20-ship
DE contract of the same year. 9-ship LHA contract of
1969 and 30-ship DD-963 contract awarded only last
week are appropriate eX8IIples • Each has or will sustain substantial capital investment in new or modernized p1ants. 15
While a rather exhaustive quotation. it covers very
well the motivating factors necessary to achieve meaningful modernization.
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Contracting in the ShiDbuiJAj.ng Industry, Some View-

points,

The current most controversial topic concerns the

Navy's single source procurement for the acquisition of the
30 destroyers in the DD-963 program.

In an address before

the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers in
1970. Mr. J. J. Henry, President of the Society remarked.
Without a doubt thiS* is one of the most controversial actions by the DOD in several years and
was pursued and put into effect without regard to
le8sona of recent history and in the face of recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Panel in their report of
july 1, 1970 to the President and the Secretary of
Defense.
Its major premise is the savings in costs obtained by purchasiJ18 from a single source of a large
number of identical units. Evidel'lCe is already beginning to accWllulate that there will be no such
savings and the possibility of purchasing the same
unit without change oyer a period of years is completely unrealistic. 1 6
Mr. Henry went on to discuss the advantages of lIaintaining a broadly based industry to encourage flexibility,
competition, and ingenuity in the design and production of
ships.

He pointed out the extreme danger of losing the

managellent know how and skills of those yards Which will
sloWly atrophy under this procurement policy.

*Mr. Henry i8 referring to the procurement of the 30
destroyers in the DD-963 project from a single Shipbuilder.

Mr. Henry i8 quite correct in the view that spreading
the contracts out in small ship lots did develop a broadly
based industry, but it did not, as has been indicated, bring
to fruition the kind of ingenuity in technique and investment in capital improvements which are also essential to
the maintenanoe of a viable industry.
The adverse impact on the shipbuilder who 108es out on
the multi-year or total package procurement contract is an
accepted fact.

The deleterious effect on the mobilization

base is also noted.

The fact must be squarely faced how-

ever, that the Navy and the Maritime Administration are
bath

convinc~d

that the best way to build ships is to do so

in reasonable numbers of standard design.

This translates

direetly into lower costs per unit and more defense and a
better merchant marine for the dollar.
,Assistant Secretary of the Navy Frank Sanders desCRibed the above mentioned factors as well as the geographical dispersion of the contract dollars as a definite weakness of the procurement.

He did list the important pros

of the policy as being the standardization possible through
a single source procurement, the market reduction of the
logistics support problems that such standardization permitted, aDd DOst importantly, the cost was less • • • estimated at the time to be on the order of $600 million lower
than the competitor's price. 17
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the argument which questions the geographical concentration of such single-source contracts, though valid
as far as the actual construction and systells integration
and test are concerned, i8 not extremely effective when
the subcontracting pattern is studied.

It has been lhown

that lome 60% of the DD-963 contract value will be subcontracted.

This is, of course, lIore true of Naval vesaels

than commercial ships because of the number and complexity
of the subsysteas involved.

In two other procurements,

the landing assault ship (LHA) and the destroyer escort
(DE-1052) class, 57.31 and 56% respectively, of the contract value was subcontracted inclusive of the government
furnished material. 18 The natural effect of this Wide subcontracting is to gain the geographic dispersion that is
necessary to infuse industrial strength.
What is of real concern in this matter, i8 the reduction in incentive to the industry as a whole beeause of the
heavy investment necessary to compete in the concept formulation/contract definition process.

Not all procurements

will be made in this manner, however, and opportunities for
the independent naval architects and the balance of the
industry will Itill exist.

There will be fewer of these

opportunities based upon the need the Navy has to achieve
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the most defense from the dollars available.

It is also

true that a controversy exists over the concept formulation/contract* definition process regarding the duplication
of effort of several independent contractors working in
competition.

Shipbuilders are concerned largely about the

expense, and this has led them to point up to the Congress
as many possible faults as might be found. **

By character-

izing the process as wasteful, the attention of the Seapower
Subcommittee members was quickly acquired.

While there is

duplication of effort, there is seldom duplication of ideas
and much technical transfusion is feasible from the use of
this procurement strategy.19

The government is capable of

taking several good concepts and integrating them to achieve
what is desired.

Certainly to do this requires complicated

*Concept formulation/contracts definition, simply defined, i8 that tera applied to a procurement strategy in
which multiple suppliers are invited to compete for a contract by providing a complete design to performance parameters supplied by the Navy. Of the many designs prepared,
several are chosen to go under contract competitively to
develop detail specifications and production plans in the
contract definition phase. A winner is eventually chosen
after the contract definition phase. The competing firms
are required to supply their own capital to compete in the
concept formulation stage, a point which causes the risk
asse•••ent in this procurement strategy to be carefully
looked at by the contractors. An important adv~age of
this technique i8 the ability of the contractor to tailor
his design to his production facilities.
**Of the six shipbuilders competing in the DD-963 concept formulation phase, all were preparing their proposals
on company funds. Costs varied, but were, on the average,
about ~2 1Iillion per proposal.
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contractual procedures which must be drawn up to utilize
only segments of a design.

While the situation depicted

may not ever become reality, it is nevertheless, an alternative which serves to point up the fact that all the work
is not a waste and several technical approaches may have
value.
The majority of the shipbuilders feel that in the
current major procurements, the Navy has not acted wisely
in eatablishing a ship acquisition system Which will project inth the future (10 years) with the end product still
being the standard ship which was originally sought.

Critics

point out that there will be numerous developments of a
technical nature Which if not fitted out during the building,
will cause the ship to be obsolete at the time of delivery,
ergo the ship will not be delivered as a standard ship but
will be greatly modified.

Furthermore, the eventual loss

of cost control on the project is predicted and the ensuing cost over-run will easily negate any anticipated saving
that the Navy had originally projected under the system.
It is the Navy position that the line can be held
against over-runs and standardization can be achieved.
Modernization will then be effected through later overhaul
and alteration procedures.

A further argument made by the

Navy is that lead time for many equipments, in particular
such items as propulsion gears, turbines, major puaps, air
compressors, etc., is such that the construction program
cannot be accelerated through parallel activity in several
shipyards due to the delivery schedule of these equipments.
Should parallel construction plans be implemented, standardization could not be applied as several proprietary sets
of major components would have to be purchased for installation.

Again, no two yards could build the same ship.
Io sum the views of the major shipbuilders is to say

that they perceive the advantage in the procurement game
to be currently with the Navy.

With few exceptions, they

view the profit performance in the past

8S

extremely poor,

and under the major forces acting in the procurement arena
currently, the potential for the future is not considered
very rosy.

Because of the program of the Maritime Adminis-

tration for the 1970's, shipbuilders view the future with
guarded optimism.

The Navy will also be acquiring ships

with renewed vigor as several-new programs under consideration for smaller, less complex, and therefore less expensive
ships in larger numbers may soon come to fruition in the mid
1970's.

It is likely that folloWing concept formulation,

the leading design will be placed with several shipbUilders
for the contract definition stage and ensuing production.
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Many_ent Trend. ln the Shj,Dbull.dj,ns Industry.

It is

an observation of this paper that the management patterns
of the major shipyards have been undergoing changes in the
past decade. changes whlch have in part been due to the contracting policies of the Department of Defense (Navy).

The

new procurements stress new management techniques. advanced
program planning and control. and the interdisciplinary organization of project teams and industrial ta1ent. 20 In
many ways. these techniques are not traditional to the management practices of the shipbuilders as they emerged from
the confusion of World War II.

The Navy. in response to the

requirements of the contracting policies instituted by the
Department of Defense in the McNamara era has designed procurements which require a specific management technique
from the contractor. particularly in the design and production planning stages for a ship construction project.
This has led not only large management oriented corporations to seek shipyards to apply their management expertise.
but it haa also made the shipyards receptive to mergers
and

purchase plans.
The result has been a progressive growth of the con-

glomerate management group overseeing and controlling the
operation of the shipyard or shipyards.

Some examples of

this trend may be found by examining the major yards and

reviewing the managellent hi story.

Bath Iron Works, once

a privately owned and controlled shipyard, is now a part
of Bath Industries, a diversified conglomerate.

Litton

Industries, a diversified conglomerate. acquired the
Ingalls Shipbuilding Diviston in 1961 and as has been
noted. completed construction work on their new facility
at Pascagoula in 1971.

The ogden Corporation maintains

management control of Avondale Shipyards and National Steel
and Shipbuilding Company is owned by a consortium of Kaiser
Industries and the Morrison-Knudsen Company.

In the latter

case, management contro1 is vested with the Kaiser Engineers
Division of Kaiser Industries.
tion, though not

~echnically

The Bethlehem Steel Corpora-

a conglomerate. nevertheless

is one of the industrial giants Which incorporated a Shipbuilding Division.
There are of course. Jlany other reaaons f or the conglomerate takeover than that of management expertise Which
such a merger would be expected to provide.

The acquisition

of the Quincy ShipbUilding Division by the General Dynaics
Corporation and the puget Sound ShipbUilding and Dry Dock
Company by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation are eases in
point.

It is probable that in these situations. the primary

reason for these acquisitions was a desire to diversify within the defense and commercial industry.

r

Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company was
acquired by Tenneco in 1968.

The first move that this

parent organization made was to introduce new management
to the company.

Mr. L. C. Ackerman, President of the

Shipyard commented on this to the Seapower Subcommittee.
His comments are very descriptive and appropriate for a
consideration of the management attitude of the conglomerate.

He said, regarding his experience in the ship-

building industry.

. . . . . I found that many management

people in the shipbuilding industry certainly knew the bow
(of a ship) from the stern, but didn't know a debit from
a credit."21

As to the results which are sought from the

management changes, he said.
• • • it is my obligation to insure that Newport News
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company makes a profit.
This is not an obligation just to the management of
Tenneco, or the stockholders. For without a profit,
the shipyard will no longer serve its customers, not
our suppliers, not our community.
But just making a profit is not enough in this
day of extreme competition for investment money. We
must realize in the shipbuilding business an adequate
return on our investment. If a competitive return is
not generated, we will not be able to attract, or even
hold, the needed capital.
It is absolutely necessary that we clearly see a
reasonable opportunity for a competitive profit before
we make the extremely large investment required to
move shipbuilding f22m a labor intensive to a capital
intensive industry.
And that pretty well sums up the situation.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUS IONS
On the Military-Industrial Complex.

An obvious conclu-

sion is that there definitely exists a framework of common
interest and association between defense and industry which
is termed the military-industrial complex.

This framework

is basically welded together by the profit motive (however
small) in industry and the continual optimism in the military that development is underway which will produce the
best weapon system for the money.

The structure is aided

and abetted by industrial and military associations which
provide unofficial and official contact for the dissemination of public information and business purposes.

Promi-

nent people in these organizations serve as influence transfer mediums between groups and the Congress.

This is an im-

portant role and can be viewed as both harmful and helpful
depending upon one's point of view.
The military-industrial complex is not a design to
usurp funds from the government to be channeled into programs with concomitant waste.

Such claims are largely

based upon emotionalism and a quest for public sympathy and
attention.

Industry, with public relations expertise can

counterattack the opinion generated by these claims but the
government appears shallow in the permitted protestations.
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It is further concluded that the nation is not far
from the day when there will be a series of industry
government links in practically every area of public
interest.

These form as a contractor perceives funding

and he examines his firm's talents against the requirement
of the government.

He may be successful in his bid and as

long as there are funds available in that program, the
government people must contract for services, reprogram
or lose the funds.

The combination of contractor interest

and government willingness serves to ensure that the funds
will be spent.

It is also true that with normal attentive-

ness, project managers will have sufficient opportunity to
discover many useful ways that funds may be utilized.

This

is not to be critical of the program with the priority of
the moment, however, upper level management must exercise
more complete control over priorities in all areas of
interest.
Qn the Contract Interface.

The contract does indeed de-

fine the legal rules for the interface between the contractor
and the Department of Defense.

This has been a highly dynamic

relationship over the past several decades as management on
both sides has shifted position to examine the behavior of
his counterpart in relation to the terms of the contract.
This paper is not suggesting which came first, in absolutes,
management sophistication or contract sophistication, however,

us

it seems generally to be true that the industrial sector
held the lead until the McNamara years when rapid change in
the Department of Defense policies caused reaction on the
part of the defense contractors.
It is concluded that the incentive contract is a
powerful instrument and is a technically correct way to
develop the best features of the defense-industrial interface.

Because it is a sophisticated instrument with respect

to its design, it must be carefully crafted to exploit the
best interest of each party.
On the Contract and the Shipbuilding Industry.

The

1960's saw the conglomerate move into the shipbuilding industry.

It is interesting to speculate why this is so.

Many avenues of thought are available, however, one which
appears to be substantiated is the obvious management
deficiencies which mueh of the industry exhibited following
World War II.

The challenge to modern, enlightened manage-

ment is thought to be a central reason for the entry of the
conglomerate into the shipbuilding business.

The Navy has

found tougher bargaining and a tightening of the contractor's
attitudes with respect to contract interpretation.

The normal

adversary relationship appears to be somewhat more strained.
This management change has brought one new shipyard into
being and introduced some new capital into older shipyards to
keep them on the competitive margin.
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These are certainly

r

healthy signs.
The total result of the new management practices is not
yet clear.

The rather traditional and labor intensive nature

of the shipbuilding industry represents a high inertia target
for the systems approach and the aviation styled management
practices.

It would seem that in the next half decade, the

more traditionally minded shipyards will be carefully
observing the effects of the new systems, ready to adopt
any or

-

al~

that are effective.
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TABLE 11

RANGE OF CONTRACT TYPES. WITH THEIR THEORETICAL ADV ANlAGES
AND DISADVANTAGES

Firm-fixed-price
Application I Where fair and reasonable price can be established at outset. For example, where there
are. reasonably definite design or performance specifications, realistic estimates,
adequate competition, valid cost or pricing
data providing reasonable price comparisons,
and/or reasonable allocation of risks.
Advantages to Shifts total risk to contractor. Minimum
administration. Simplifies budgeting. Some
government
degree of price competition. Uniformity for
bid evaluation. Contractor responsible for
management. Well-defined work statement and
specifications •
Disadvantages Presolution of design problems. Price must
to government contain contingencies. No 'n-process control
of work. Less visibility of cost data. Compl~te formality for changes.
Advantages to Potential for higher profit. Minimum governcontractor
ment control. Well-defined specifications I
better cost estimates. Less financial audit.
Disadvantages Total assumption of financial and technical
to contractor rtake. Risk of 10s8 liability for work in
process. Requires vigilance to institute
change claims. Goverrunent does not accept
cost contingencies.

'IABLE II
(Continued)

Fixed-price with escalation
Application.

Where market or labor condi'tions are unstable
over extended produetion period. Where contingencies must be identified and covered
separately by escalation.

Advantages to May result in downward adjustment..
government
tor responsible for management.
Disadvantages Increased administrative costs.
to government of index distorts.

Contrac-

Poor choice

Advantages to Spreads risk.
contractor
Disadvantages Contains absolute ceiling. Poor choice of into contractor dex distorts. Escalation limited to industrywide contingencies. Contingencies within contractor control excluded.
.

Fixed-price-incentive (cost only)
Application

Where cost uncertainties exist and there is the
possibility of cost reduction and/or performance improvements by giving contractor (a) a
degree of cost responsibility and (b) a positive profit incentive.

Advantages to Spreads risk. Less reason for contingencies
government
in price. Encourages efficiency. Contractor
responsible for management. No ceiling on
incentive for efficiency.
Disadvantages No ceiling on profit. Increased administrative
to government costs. Must budget to ceiling price. Minimum control of work in process. Complex negotiations. Precludes technical direction. Limits technical innovation.
Disadvantages Price ceiling. Detailed accounting records.
to contractor Government verification of costs. Complex
negotiations. Government tends to treat 88
cost type contract controls, cost principles,
and so forth.
Advantages to Potential for higher profit for higher risk.
contractor
Rewards good management. Less government control.

tABLE 11

(Continued)
Fixed-price multiple incentive
Application

Where improved performance desired.

Advantages to
goverruaent

Motivates contractor to surpass performance
t~ets.

administration. May increase costs.
Disadvantagea Complex
Unbalanced
incentives may result in undesirto government able trade-offs.
Contract must be specifiC.
Advantages to
contractor

Spreads cost and pfofit risk.

Disadvantages
to contractor

Incentive measurements may be inaccurate.
Delays in profit determination. Changes
difficult to administer.

Fixed-price redeterminable
Application

For quantity production-where realistic price
can be negotiated initially but not for later
period(s) of performance.

Advantages to
government

High possibility of downward

Disadvantages
to government

Little motivation for cost reduction. Prompt
price redetermination required. Prospective
pricing period must conform to contractor's
system. Not used until after negotiation of
firm fixed price not satisfactory.

Advantages to
('contractor
Disadvantages
to contractor

a~U8tment.

Reduces risk.
May include absolute ceiling. More detailed
accounting records. Government verification
of accounting records. High possibility of
downward adjustment.

tABLE II
(Continued)

-

Cost
Application

Where performance is uncertain and reasonable cost estimates impossible.

Advantages to
government

No fee.

Disadvantages
to government

No motive to reduce cost. Government partially responsible for management.

Advantages to
contractor

Minimum risk.

Disadvantages
to contractor

No fee.

Cost-sharirur;
Application

Where development of research projects 1s
jointly sponsored by government and contractor, and there i8 a high probability of
commercial benefit.

Advantases to
government

No fee. Bears only portion of cost.
vates for cost reduction.

Disadvantages
to government

Limited to certain R&D caees. Limits competition. Must show conclusive evidence of
probability of commercial benefit.

Advantages to
contractor

Government participation in commercial development.

Disadvantages
to contractor

Cost share may be excessive.
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Moti-

TABLE 11

(Cont1nued)
Cost-plus 1ncent1ve fee
App11cat1on

For development and test when 1ncentive
formula can prov1de 1ncent1ve for effective
management. Where feasible, performance incent1ves used together with cost and schedule
1ncent1ves.

Advant88es to
government

Shared r1sk. Mot1vates for cost effect1veness through bonus-penalty arrangement.
Shares 1n-process control of work. L1m1ted
price contingenc1es. Cost visibility.

Disadvantages
to government

Overrun costs. High administrat1ve costs.
Complex negotiat1ons. High risks. Reduced
opportun1ty to manage.

Advantages to
contractor

Limited r1sk. Possibility of increased fee,
Assures recovering costs. Rewards good
management.

D1sadvantages Reduced fee because of reduced riskS. Abto contractor solute limit on fee. D1sallowance of certa1n
normal business costs. Government engagement.
Complexitr of negotiat1ons.

Cost-plus-multiple-incentive-fee
Application

Where performance objectives are determined
and development is probable. Appropriate for
major systems development.

Advantages to
government

Establishes relative value of cost, performance, and schedule. Motivates for superior
performance. *Chievement •

Disadvantages
to government

Unbalanced incentive may result in undesirable
trade-offs. Complex administration.

Advantages to
cont.actor

Spreads cost and profit risk.
off decisions.

Disadvantages
to contractor

Incentive measurement may be inaccurate. Del*ys in profit determination. Changes difficult to administer.

Incentive trade-

SSW}

TABLE 11

(Continued)
Cost-plus-fixed-fee
Application

Where performance is uncertain and accurate
cost estimates are impossible. For research
or other development effort when the task or
job can be clearly defined, a definite goal
or target expressed, and the specific end
product required.

Advantages to
governaent

Control of delivery schedule. Ease of governmental redirection of effort. Maximum control
of work. Emphasizes performance objectives.

Disadvantages
to govermaent

Low motivation for cost efficiency. High
risk. Not for development of major weapons
once exploration indicates engineering development feasible. Maximum administrative burden.
Funding uncertainties. Settlement of final
costs is prolonged.

Advantages to
contractor

Low east and technical risk. Risk of loss of
government property borne by government.

Disadvantages Maximum government controls and reporting.
to contractor Disallowance of certain normal business costs.
Lower fees because of lower risks.

SQQrce I Hudson B. Drake, ..Major DOD Procurements at
War with Reality," Howard Business Review, January - February
1970, p. 119 - 140.
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TABLE III
NET CHANGES IN DEFENSE SPENDING AND EMPLOYMENT AS CONTRASTED
WITH OTHER FEDERAL AND STATE AND LOCAL SPENDING AND EMPLOYMENT
FY 1964 to
FY 1968

FY 1968 to
FY 1972

Change (Current dollars
in billions)
+27.2
Defense spending
Other federal spend+34.8
ing
spend&
Local
State
+36.2
ing
Change (Constant FY1972
dollars in billions)
+24.1
Defense spending
Other Federal spend+31.9
ing
State & Local spend+29.6
ing
Public Employment( x 10 3)
Defense (includes
+1,114
Military)

FY 1964 to
FY 1972

- 2.0

+25.2

+55.5

+90.3

+53.7

+89.9

-23.9

+ 0.2

+36

84

+68.3

+29.0

+58.6

133

-1,247
+

+

379

Other Federal

+

State & Local

+2,229

+1,849

+4,078

Total Public
Employment

+3,573

+

751

+4,324

Total Labor Force ( x 10 3)
Defense a
+2,232

-2,508

276

+4,542

+8,951

+13,493

+6,774

+6,443

+13,217

All Other
Total Labor Force
Change a

230

149

. a Includes military personnel, civilians employed in the
Unlted States,
and defense related employment in the United
States'
industry.
Source: Statement of Sec
the Fiscal Year 1972-76 D fretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird
get, Toward a National S
~ ense Program and the 1972 Budy Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, (Washington , .1971)curlt
, p , l7L
on
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TABLE IV
PRIME MILITARY CONTRACT AWARDS 1960-1967 TO TOP 25 u.s. COMPANIES FOR
FIRMS TOTALING MORE THAN $1 BILLION IN THIS 7-YEAR PERIOD (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Contractor/Ranking

1961

1962

FISCAL YEAR
1963
1964
1965

1966

1967

7-Yr.
Total

% of I
Total Sa e

1. Lockheed Aircraft
1,175 1,149 1,517 1,455 1,715 1,531 1,817
10,619
88
2. General Dynamics
1,460 1,197 1,033
987 1,179 1,136 1,832
8,824
67
3. McDonnell Douglas
527
779
863 1,360 1,026 1,001 2,125
7,681
75
54
4. Boeing Company
920 1,133 1,356 1,365
583
914
912
7,183
5. General Electric
875
976 1,021
893
824 1,187 1,290
7.066
19
6. No, American Rockwell 1,197 1,032 1,062 1,019
746
520
689
6,265
55 7
11
7. United Aircraft
625
663
530
625
632 1,139 1,097
5,3
7
8. American Tel. & Tel.
551
468
579
636
588
672
673
4,167
9
~ 9. Martin-Marietta
692
803
767
476
316
338
290
3,682
62
-+ 10. Sperry-Rand
408
466
446
374
318
427
484
2,923
35
oe 11. Gp.neral Motors
282
449
444
256
254
508
625
2,81 B
2
12. Grumman Aircraft
238
304
390
396
353
323
488
2,49 4
67
13. General Tire
290
366
425
364
302
327
273
2,3 47
3
5755
14. Raytheon
305
407
295
253
293
368
403
2,3 24
15. AVCO
251
323
253
279
234
506
449
2,295
7
16. Hughes
331
234
312
289
278
337
419
2,200
a
17 ~ Westinghouse Electric
308
24-6
323
237
261
349
453
2,177
1'3
18. Philco-Ford
200
269
228
211
312
440
404
2,064
3
19. RCA
392
340
329
234
214
242
268
2,019
16
20. Bendix
269
286
290
257
235
282
296
1,9 15
42
21. Textron
66
117
151
216
196
555
497
1,798
36
22. Ling-Temco-Vought
47
133
206
247
265
311
535
1,744
70
23. International Tel. & Tel.202
244
266
256
207
220
255
1,650
19
7
24. IBM
330
155
203
332
186
181
195
1,583
b
46
61
25. Raymond International
84
196
71
548
462
1,568
a
a Data is not available.
b A consortium of Morrison-Knudsen, Brown & Root and J.A. Jones
Construction Company.
Source: James L. Clayton, ed., The Economic Impact of the Cold War (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), p. 44.

TABLE V
DEFENSE CONTRACT AWARDS AND PAYROLLS-STATES, 1965-1967 (DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)a

1965
-j.JO

State

o

rlrotl)
mH'd
;j~ H

~~m
o~

1967

1966

Estimated
Annual
Payroll

.p..O

o

rlmtl)
cdH'd
~-IJH

Mil~

Civ~

7,781

~~m

8~

Estimated
Annual
Payroll

-l4O

o

rlrotl)
roH'd
;j -IJ H

Estimated
Annual
payroll

~~ro

~3~

Mile:

CiV~

Mil~

Civ9-

6,774

35,713 8,432

7,212

41,817

130
138
105
54
983

228
57
48
29
1,046

282
155
155
72
111
248
96
55
5, 813 1,099

233
52
52
29
1,189

297
86
250
127
6,689

9,35 0
184
166
139
58
1 ,15 0

250
1,180
38
244
633

163
23
43
142
362

100
23
8
230
166

256
2,052
37
328
767

188
18
41
192
361

106
27
9
191
189

210
1,936
52
358
799

223
20
50
186
384

116
32
10
209
213

Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

662
72
12
422
605

396
183
31
219
41

224
121
3
200
83

799
64
20
920
1,068

437
181
25
245
49

259
155
3
205
97

1,148
65
15
1,064
898

532
176
22
304
52

287
171
4
221
116

Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
LoUisiana
Maine

134229
43
256
69

8
173
172
128
65

4
32
79
44
10

248
313
70
303
51

8
154
201
170
64

5
34
95
47
11

279
399
124
656
57

9
179
289
199
61

6
40
109
57
13

Maryland

584

254-

343

843

256

326

870

327

366

o~

Total (all
26,631
states)
Alabama
165
Alaska
74
Arizona
177
.: Arkansas
39
$ California
5,154
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dlst. of Col.
Florida

-

8,044

233
56
61
1 ,3~~

.

TABLE V
(Continued)

+'.0

o

State

r-lctltll

ctl~'d

;j

+'

~

~§~
0«

-a

1965
Estimated
Annual
Payroll

o

r-lctltll
ctl~'d

;j +' ~

~~ctl
0:oo:t:

1966

~

Estimated
Annual
Payroll

r-lctltll

ctl~'d

;j -+.:l

~

~~ctl

8~

1967
Estimated
Annual
Payroll
CiV~
Mil~

Mil~

Civ~

1,336
918
498
162
1,113

161
105
26
131
152

184
90
15
46
143

1,422
1,034
651
115
2,278

139
104
26
143
178

193

6
25
18
62
171

14
80
32
110
1,090

54

90
36
36
217

8
28
20
60
181

78
103
29
163
1,235

57
83
37
29
227

10
30
19
65
243

111
174
344
59
111

75
342
63
8
333

86
2,819
449
83
89
1,5

94
183
373
70
133

80
282
77
9
321

80
3,262
448
17
1,603

96
168
439
76
135

161
26
77

169
23
510
56
99

158
90
1,665
132
176

176

196
24
511
64
117

157
99
1,649
198
181

210
20
77
44
243

88
313
87
9
354
226
25
52B
71
130

Mil~

Civ~

1,179
533
260
152
1,061

153
105
24
105
104

172
83
13
42
114

69
43
19
52
820

50
101
40
41
166

New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

84
2,229
288
49
863

Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

120
40
989
86
82

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

+'.0

V\

o Montana

Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

1~~

~~

44
263

1?~

50
166

TABLE V
(Continued)
..a

+-'
0

State

r-lmtll
«1F-4'd
~ +-' F-4

1965

~§~
U«

Mil.
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
..... Vermont
V\
-a.

Virginia .
Washington
W7st Virginia
W~sconsin

Wyoming

Undistributed

"6
r-lmtll

«1F-4'd
+-' F-4

~

~Qm

c

..a

..a 1966

Estimated
Annual
Payroll
C.~v. d

8~

+-'

Estimated
Annual
Payroll
Mil. c

o

r-lmtll
mF-4re::J
~ +-' F-4

~Q'"

Civ.

d

8~

1967

Estimated
Annual
Payroll
Mil. c

34
90
798
24
2

9
45
399
139
0

23
502
2,292
170
81

37
91
938
27
2

9
44
448
170
1

9
538
3,547
179
100

38
90
1 ,068
28
1

10
49
515
203
1

473
546
90
203
8

444
211
3
22
25

540
157
7
12
4

426
444
149
365
11

476
203
3
20
25

570
174
8
15
4

665
606
140
384
33

590
250
3
1:7
24-

623
197
9
23
5

3,363

140

°

4,000

0

°

4,435

0

0

Data for contracts refer to awards made in the Fiscal Year specified; expenditures
relating to those awards may extend over several years.
Awards of $10,000 or more
impact of prime-contracting
in which a prime contractor
work is done
c
For shore based personnel
d

d

21
197
1,447
191
32

a

b

Civ.

for supplies, services and construction. Figures reflect
on State distribution of defense work. Often the State
is located is not the State in which the subcontracted
only.

Direct hire employees only.
H
Source: James L. Clayton t ed., The Economic Impact of the Cold War (New York:
arcourt. Brace & World, 1970),
p. 32-33.

TABLE VI
NET PROFIT AFTER TAXES AS A PERCENT OF SALES. A
COMPARISON OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY WITH OTHEl MAlt1UFACTURING
CORPORATIONS IN DIFFERENT SECTORS OF tHE ECONOMY
1957 THROUGH 1964

YEAR

ALL
MANUFACTURINGa
CORPORATIONS

NON
DURABLE
GOODS

DURABLE
GOODS

DEFENSE
INDUSTRY

1957

4.8

4.9

4.8

2.9

1958

4.2

4.4

3.9

2.4

1959

4.8

4.9

4.8

1.6

1960

4.4

4.8

4.0

1.4

1961

4.3

4.7

3.9

1.8

1962

4.5

4.7

4.4

2.4

1963

4.7

4.9

4.5

2.3

1964

5.2

5.4

5.1

2.6

arhe newspaper industry is not included.
Source, Aerospace Industries Association, 1965 AeroFacts and Figures, (Aerospace Industries Association
erica, Inc. 1965), p. 17.

s~a~

o
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~ux

DEFENSE AWARDS BY TYPE OF CONTRACTING PRICING PROVISION FISCAL YEARS 1955-1965
Type of Prlc ing
Provilion (Per Cent)

1955 1956

1957

1958

pH'
1~~!Cal
9 19 0 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965

39.7

36.4

35.3

27.8

32.8

31.4

31.5

38.0

41.5

46.3

50.7

Fixed Price Incentive 22.9

19.2

17.8

19.2

15.3

13.6

11.2

12.0

15.8

18.5

23.7

1.4

1.9

1.2

3.2

3.2

3.2

3.2

4.1

11.7

14.1

14.1

19.7

24.1

29.9

33.2

34.3

36.8

36.6

32.5

20.7

12.0

9.4

16.3

18.4

15.8

16.6

14.4

15.0

17.5

13.4 10.3

9.1

2.1

Firm Fixed Price

Cost Plus Incentive

Fee

COSt Plus Fixed Fee

c;

Other Special Contract

w TyPes

M
Source. William McCauley, "DefeMe Procureraent and Contracting. An Analysis of
U-ragemen t Change. and IlIp8Qts on the Defense Industry,· Unpublished thesiS,
n versity of Nebraska, (Lincoln, Nebraska. 1966), p. 51.

TABLE XII
EXPENDITURE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND MISSILE HARDWARE
BY COST PLUS FIXED FEE CONTRACT DURING PERIOD 1955-1962
TyPe of Expenditure
and Contract Type
(Billions of Dollars)

~i,ca1

Year
1959 1960 1961

1962

3.2

3.4

3.4

1955-1962
Increase 2.8

5.2

5.5

6.0

6.1

1955-1962
Increase 3,;
Total
6•

7.8

7.8

8.3

8.3

1955-1962
Increase 5. 7

1955

1956

1957

1~8

Missile Systems

0.6

0.9

1.7

2.2

3.0

Research and Deve10plllent

2.2

2.3

3.2

4.0

CPFF Contracts

2.6

3.8

5.3

7.3

..... .

'tl

Source. William McCauley, -Defense Procurement and Contracting. An Analysis of
Management Change. and Impacts on the Defense Industry," Unpublished Thesis, Universityof Nebraska, (Lincoln, Nebraska. 1966), p. 53.

TABLE XIII
FINANCIAL SUMMARY OF SIXTY INCENTIVE AND FORTY-SEVEN
COST PLUS FIXED FEE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CONTRACTS
FISCAL YEAR 1962-1963
CPFF

INCENTIVE

l~ 7

60

Number of Contracts
Negotiated Target Costs

$2,049,662

$328,562

Final Cost Allowed

$2,027,660

$334,476

Difference

$

22,002

$

5, 9 ]l~
1.8%

Target Cost Over-run, Per cent

1.08%

Under-run, Per cent
Negotiated Target Profit

$176,248

$19,056

Final Profit at Completion

$171,562

$18,728

Average Negotiated target
Profit

5.8%
8.3%

Average Final Target

5.7%

Over-runs
Number
Per Cent

23

28

38%

60%

37

19

62%

40%

Under-runs
Number
Per Cent

Source: William McCauley "Defense P
Contrac t i ng : An Ana lys . ~ f" 'M'
rocurement and
on th D f
1. 0
anagement Changes ano I
t
Neb e e e~se Industry," Unpublished Th
mpac s
_ raska, L1ncoln, Nebraska: 1966, p. 70~SiS, University of
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TABLE XIV
FINANCIAL SUMMARY OF 139 NAVY FIXED PRICE INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
DURING THE PERIOD 1954-1962 (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

Number of
Contracts

1954-1956

1957-1959

1960-1961

1962

48

47

24

20

Negotiated Target
Cost
$1,501,881

2,534,521

1,431,464

1,103,005

$1,395,576
106,305

2,466,874
n7,647

1,499,493
68,029

1,096,339
6,666

7.1%

2.7%

Negotiated Target
Profit
$130,732

222,661

124,390

98,488

Final Profit at
Completion

$145,237

241,656

114,505

101,127

8.7%

8.8%

8.7%

8.9%

10.4%

9.8%

7.6%

Over-runs
Number
Per cent

9.2%

6
13%

15
32%

16
67%

Under-runs
Number
Per cent

8
40%

42
87%

32
68%

8
33%

12
60%

Final Cost
Allowed

% Target Cost
Over-run (+)
or
Under-run(-)

Average Negotiated
Target Profit
Average Final
Profit

4.75%
0.6%

Source: William M C
Contractin: An Anal s~sa~ie~: Defense Procurement and
the Defense ~ndustry Unpublis~~~ ement Chan es and 1m acts
Nebraska, (Lincoln, Nebraska'.
Thesis, University of
1966), p. 72.
1~J

TABLE XV

PRINCIPAL SHIPYARDS IN THE UNITED STATES CAPABLE OF
CONSTRUCTING LARGE COMMERCIAL AND NAVAL SHIPS
COASTAL

SHIPYARD

REGION

Bath Iron Works
Bath, Maine

EMPLOYMENT MAX SHIP

LEVEL

Northeast

a2.800

General Dynamics Corp. Northeast
Quincy, Mass.
Groton, Conn.
Northeast

a8,500

SIZE

Length Beam feet
650 x 80
940 x 137

a12,500

690 x

84

Sun Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co.
Chester, Penna.

Middle
Atlantic

. 84,200

800 x 135

Bethlehem Steel Corp.
Sparrows Pt •• Md.

Middle
Atlantic

b 16,OOO

1150 x 190

Maryland ShipbUilding
& Dry Dock Co.
Baltimore. Md.

Middle
Atlantic

b12,OOO

775 x 106

Newport News Shipbldg. Middle
Atlantic
Newport News, Va.

a22,OOO

1100 x 140

& Dry Dock Co.

Avondale Shipyards
Westwego, La.

Gulf

b9,OOO

Alabama Dry Dock &
Shipbuilding Co.
Mobile, Ala.

Gulf

b25,OOO

Ingalls Nuclear Div.
PascagOUla, Miss.

Gulf

a5,OOO

I

Litton Ship Systems Div.Gulf
Pascagoula, Miss.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.
Beaumont, Texas

Gulf

all,OOO
b4,975

600 x

90

750 x 105
690 x

94

1050 x 175
675 x

85

TABLE XV

(cone)

COASTAL
SHIPYARD

REGION

EMPLOYMENT
WEt

MAX SHIP
SIZE
Length Beam feet
605 x 105

National Steel &
Shipbldg. Co.
San Diego, Calif.

Southwest

b3,398

Todd Shipb1dg. Corp.
San Pedro, Calif.

Southwest

bS,500

665

x

85

Seattle, Wash.

Northwest

b5,700

600 x

85

Lockheed Shipbldg.
Corp.
Seattle, Wash.

Northwest

b10,OOO

700 x

94

aActual employment as expressed by man88ement during
the hearings held by the Seapower Subcommittee in July and
August 1970.
bMaximum employment of which the shipyard 1s capable
as reported in Principal Sbipbu\ldlM and Repair Facillties
of tbe Unlted States. a joint publication by the Department
of Defense and the Department of Commerce. Actual elDploy~
ment for these yards may be estimated as approximately 30
to 50% of this figure.
Source, U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed
Services, Stt;U! of Shipyards. Hearina8 91st Congress,
2nd sess.. 190, Departll8nt of Commerce/Department of Defense,
e
.
1. 0
•
United ~~a~e8 WashiJ!18tonl Dept. of the Navy, 1
February 1 0

°
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FIGURE 1
PROFIT ON SALES; HARD GOODS INDUSTRIES vs GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
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320.0
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304.6
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345.7
8.0

356.4
7.8

389.4
8 2

412.7
8.5

443.1
8.9

492.2
9.5
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9. 3

575.4
8. 3

~ENEG BD $M 'I!l.7
Pro fi t
5.8

26.6
4. 9

26.3
4. 2

28.5
4.0

25.1
3 .6

29.3
3. 1

31~83j~15
3.0
3•

3e·~
•

~TC/SEC $M
JG
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Pro fi t ..

0

31.2
:19..3
2.9· 2.9

34-.8
3 .0

.Source: U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Military Budget and National Priorities:
Hear1ngs 91st Congress, 1st sess., 11 June 1969, p. 530.

FIGURE 2
PROFIT ON TOTAL CAPITAL INVESTMENT, HARD GOODS INDUSTRIES vs GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
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I

1959

I

1960

I

1961

t

1962

I

1963

I

1961+

31+16
17.0

391+2
11+.6

1+316
11+.3

4425
12.5

1+181+
12.2

57800 62100
18.8
15.9

65200
15.1

70000
18.5

731+00
19.2

77900
20.1+

31+86
19.1

I

1965
1+123
14.3

I

1966
4911
13.0

86000 97900
22.6
23. 1

I

1967
5556
13.0
1101+00
18.2

Source: U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The MilitarY ~Udget and National
Economic priorities: Hearin~s 91st Congress, 1st sess., 11 June 19 9, p.53 1•

FIGURE 3
DEFENSE PROFITS-AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL CAPITAL INVESTED
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FIGURE 4
DEFENSE PROFITS AS A PERCENT OF EQUITY CAPITAL AND SALES
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FIGURE
lto

COST PLUS FIXED FEE AND INCENTIVE CO~TRACTS AS A PERCENT OF
TOTAL CONTRACT AWARD DOLLARS
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FIGURE 6
RANGE OF ACTUAL COSTS FROM TARGET COST FOR 139 NAVY INCENTIVE
CONTRACTS DURING THE PERIOD 1954-1962
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FIGURE 7
EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS: NAVAL AND PRIVATE SHIPYARDS
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FIGURE 8
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES IN U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
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